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INTRODUCTION 
LGBT equality and religious freedom increasingly appear to be on a 
collision course.  The  Supreme  Court’s  decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 in 
which the Court ruled that states may not exclude same sex couples from 
1 F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law Emeritus, George Washington 
University. I am grateful to Andy Koppelman, Dan Mach, Doug NeJaime, Jim Oleske, Liz 
Sepper, and Bob Tuttle for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, prepared for a 
Symposium hosted by the Alabama Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review on March 
27, 2015, and to Bill Cohen and Harrington Park Press for generous promotional efforts. 
The errors are mine. 
2 135   S.   Ct.   2584   (2015)   (invalidating   Ohio’s   exclusion   of   same   sex   couples   from  
marriage). Obergefell was consolidated with Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S.Ct. 1041 (2015) 
(Kentucky); Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S.Ct. 1040 (2015) (Tennessee); and DeBoer v. Snyder, 
135 S.Ct. 1040 (2015) (Michigan). In Obergefell, several Justices made specific references 
to concerns of religious freedom. See 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (Kennedy, J., opinion for the 
Court); id. at 2625-26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2638-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
id. at 2643 (Alito, J, dissenting). 
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marriage, has raised the intensity and political salience of this conflict. 
Obergefell will energize an already growing movement to expand the 
coverage of laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity, and simultaneously invigorate religious resistance to that 
movement.  
In the battles to come, the  Court’s  decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc.3 (hereinafter   “Hobby Lobby”) will play a central role. Hobby 
Lobby upheld a claim under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act4 
(hereinafter   “federal   RFRA” or   “RFRA”) by a business corporation 
objecting, on religious grounds, to the inclusion of certain contraceptives in 
the  firm’s  health  insurance  policy  for  employees.   Inevitably, Hobby Lobby 
and its vision of religious freedom will shape the conversation about the 
enactment, content, and enforcement of LGBT anti-discrimination laws. 
Hobby Lobby involved application of federal RFRA, a law that 
restrains only the federal government, 5  to the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. The far broader topic of LGBT rights involves the 
new regime of marriage equality, and the evolving bodies of federal, state, 
and local law on both religious liberty and anti-discrimination. For all sides 
                                                        
3  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
4  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb—2000bb-4 (2012). RFRA's command to the federal 
government is succinctly set forth in id. §§ 2000bb-1: 
 a)In general 
 Government shall not substantially burden a  person’s   exercise  
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section. 
(b)Exception  
  Government   may   substantially   burden   a   person’s   exercise   of  
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to 
the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.  
5  The decision in City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) held 
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments. For an early and 
important   take   on   how   the  Court’s   interpretation   of   federal  RFRA   in  Hobby Lobby may 
influence the development of state law, see Kara Loewentheil, The Satanic Temple, Scott 
Walker,   and   Contraception:   A   Partial   Account   of   Hobby   Lobby’s   Implications   for   State  
Law, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498637. 
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in this conflict, the targets are multiplying, moving quickly, and interacting 
rapidly.6 
Consider how these questions map onto the venue for this symposium. 
In mid-July, 2015, Alabama remained in conflict between federal court 
orders to allow same sex marriage,7 and a state supreme court order to not 
allow same sex marriage.8 Alabama also has a state RFRA enshrined in its 
own constitution, 9  but it has no state statutory law that forbids 
discrimination, based on sexual orientation or gender identity, in 
employment or public accommodations. 10  When marriage equality fully 
arrives in Alabama, how and why will Hobby Lobby, a decision applying                                                         
6  The most intense episodes in the Indiana RFRA controversy, discussed in Part III 
infra, occurred soon after the delivery of an early draft of this paper to an audience at the 
University of Alabama. The targets keep moving. 
7  Searcy v. Strange, 81 F.Supp.3d 1285 (S.D. Ala. 2015) (holding unconstitutional 
Alabama’s   exclusion   of   same   sex   couples   from   marriage).   When   the   order   in   Searcy 
became effective, Alabama immediately experienced considerable legal uncertainty about 
the status of same sex couples seeking to marry. See Sandhya Somashekhar, Judicial 
Defiance in Alabama: Same Sex Marriages Begin, but Most Counties Refuse, 
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/alabama-judge-stakes-out-defiant-stance-against-same-sex-marriages/2015/02/09/ 
a1be2de4-b06f-11e4-854b-a38d13486ba1_story.html. 
8  After the federal court ruling, the Alabama Supreme Court issued orders to the 
state’s  probate  judges  to  not  issue  marriage  licenses  to  same  sex  couples.  Ex  parte  State  of  
Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752 (Ala. 2015). The 
federal litigation then turned into  a  class  action  against  the  states’  probate  judges.  Strawser  
v. Strange, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8439 (S.D. Ala. 2015). On June 29, the Alabama 
Supreme Court issued a brief Corrected Order, giving parties until July 6 to file briefs on 
the question of the relationship between Obergefell and  the  Court’s  prior  orders  to  probate  
judges. Corrected Order, Ex parte State of Ala. ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460 (Ala. 
2015), available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2015/images/06/29/al.pdf. A number of 
Alabama counties have stopped issuing marriage licenses to anyone. Ross Hackman, Meet 
the Alabama Judges Who Refuse to Issue Marriage Licenses – Gay or Straight, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/12/alabama-
judges-gay-marriage-licenses. For discussion of the current procedural and remedial 
tangles over marriage equality in Alabama, see Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: 
The Judicial Process and the Last Stand Against Marriage Equality in the Land of George 
Wallace, NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2596633. 
9  ALA. CONST. art. 1, §3.01 (amended 1998); See generally Thomas C. Berg, The 
Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment: An Interpretive Guide, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 47 
(2000). 
10  Alabama has no state wide statutory law that protects anyone from discrimination in 
employment or public accommodations. The state does have a fair housing law, ALA. CODE 
§ 24-8-4 (1991), but it does not include sexual orientation or gender identity as prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. 
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federal RFRA, have any impact at all in this state, with its separate and 
independent RFRA and its nearly blank page of relevant civil rights 
statutes? 
In what follows, I will appraise the legal and political salience of 
Hobby Lobby, and religious freedom concerns more generally, with respect 
to the development of LGBT anti-discrimination law. My overarching 
thesis is that the political impact of Hobby Lobby may be much greater than 
its legal impact. In the adjudicative process under federal law, I predict that 
Hobby Lobby will prove to be little or no impediment to full recognition of 
LGBT rights,11 where they exist. With respect to state law, that prediction is 
more difficult to make with confidence, but for the reasons offered in Part 
III.C., I adhere to that forecast.  
In contrast, the force of Hobby Lobby in politics, especially in the short 
run, may be dramatic. Many religious conservatives will continue to oppose 
the expansion of LGBT rights, and will rely on principles enunciated in 
Hobby Lobby to demand broad exemptions from any new obligations of 
non-discrimination law. The First Amendment Defense Act, 12  recently 
proposed in Congress, is a prime example. Those who favor LGBT rights 
will offer their own account of the Hobby Lobby principle as a reason to 
oppose any such exemptions, even very narrow ones. Hobby Lobby may 
thus be an operative political factor in a persistent stalemate with respect to 
legislative change in the rights of LGBT people to be free of discrimination. 
Parts I and II both focus on federal law, where Hobby Lobby’s  impact  
will be most immediate and direct. Part I first sketches LGBT rights under 
federal constitutional law, including the case of Rowan County Clerk Kim 
Davis. Part I then analyzes potential conflicts between RFRA and other 
parts of federal statutory law and regulation. Part II focuses on the ways in 
which Obergefell and Hobby Lobby are likely to color the conversation, 
legal and political, about expanding federal law protections against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity – for leading 
example, in the newly proposed Equality Act. 13  Part II introduces a                                                         
11  For an earlier, briefer iteration of this prediction, see Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and 
the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 36, 93-100 
(2015).  
12  H.R. 2802, 114th Congress (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 
114th-congress/house-bill/2802. I discuss the Act in Part II, B, infra (text at notes 115-
123). 
13  On July 23, 2015, U.S. Senators Baldwin, Booker, and Merkley introduced The 
Equality Act, S. 1858, 114th Cong. See Historic, Comprehensive LGBT Non-
Discrimination Legislation Introduced in Congress¸ MERKLEY.SENATE.GOV (July 23,  
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distinction between broad, generic protections of religious freedom, such as 
RFRA, and explicit, context-specific accommodations, such as the right of 
religious entities to prefer co-religionists in employment, or wedding 
vendors to refuse to serve same sex couples. This distinction is crucial to 
the conversation about religious accommodation in Parts II and III. 
Part III is devoted to developments under state law, where the 
geographical disconnect between religious freedom principles and statutory 
LGBT rights is significant. Where state-based rights of religious freedom 
appear to be strong, statutory LGBT rights are frequently weak or non-
existent; where statutory LGBT rights are strongest, religious exemption 
rights do not exist or in any event are highly unlikely to trump anti-
discrimination law. Now that marriage equality has become nationwide and 
constitutionally mandated, these geographical disparities will become 
increasingly significant.  
Part III-A describes current legal circumstances, including the ongoing 
cases of vendors who refuse to serve same sex weddings, in light of this 
disconnect. Part III-B analyzes recent and anticipated legislative fights, 
including those involving religious charities, and the role that Hobby Lobby 
has played and continues to play in legislative discourse. Part III-C focuses 
on the adjudicative battles that lie ahead between LGBT rights and religious 
freedom, and the significance of Hobby Lobby for those contests.  
 
I. LGBT ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RIGHTS IN FEDERAL LAW 
  
The non-discrimination rights in federal law for LGBT people arise 
from the U.S. Constitution, Acts of Congress, and actions by the Executive 
Branch. Judicial and administrative interpretations of all those sources play 
a major role. Let’s  start  at  the  top. 
The U.S. Constitution. Thus far, the primary source of LGBT rights in 
federal law is the U.S. Constitution. As construed and applied in Romer v. 
                                                                                                                                            
2015), http://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/historic-comprehensive-lgbt-
non-discrimination-legislation-introduced-in-congress. In the section by section summary, 
the   Act’s   sponsors   describe   its   purposes   as   “Ending   Discrimination   against   LGBT  
Americans in Public Accommodations, Education, Federal Financial Assistance, 
Employment,  Housing,  Credit,  and  Federal  Jury  Service.”  SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY ET AL., 
SECTION BY SECTION SUMMARY OF THE EQUALITY ACT (2015), available at 
http://www.merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EqualityAct_SectionBySection.pdf. The 
full text of the proposed Act is available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/ 
imo/media/doc/EqualityAct.pdf. 
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Evans, 14  Lawrence v. Texas, 15  U.S. v. Windsor, 16  and Obergefell v. 
Hodges,17 the 5th and 14th Amendments have become significant sources of 
protection for freedom of intimate association and civil equality – most 
recently, marriage equality – for members of the LGBT community. Indeed, 
the startlingly rapid movement to marriage equality drives a great deal of 
the conversation about wider expansion of LGBT rights. The relevant 
federal constitutional protections are rights only against the government and 
its agents, and do not apply to private actors, such as for-profit businesses 
and religious entities. Nevertheless, marriage equality creates an immediate 
occasion for wider recognition of equality whenever marital status is linked 
to rights against private parties.  
In the context of this Symposium, two additional points are worth 
highlighting about the protections of the federal constitution. First, although 
the Supreme Court has never formally elevated the standard of review in 
Fifth18 or Fourteenth19 Amendment cases involving sexual orientation, it is 
hard to imagine a federal court upholding any state policy that explicitly 
discriminates based on sexual orientation.20 I suspect that there are few such 
laws or explicit policies remaining in any jurisdiction in the U.S.21 This is                                                         
14  517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). 
15  539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
16  133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013). 
17  135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015). 
18  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
19  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-04; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer, 517 U.S. 
at 636. 
20  As others have noted, marriage laws discriminated de jure based on the sex of a 
partner, and only de facto based on sexual orientation. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE 
CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 
(1996); see also Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men 
is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). Professor Koppelman was among the 
first to press this line of argument in gay rights law in his note, The Miscegenation 
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988).  
21  State laws on assisted reproductive technology may still be based on an exclusive 
model of different sex couples, but that model will not survive. See DMT v. TMH, 129 
So.3d 320 (Fla. 2013) (striking down exclusion of same sex couple from coverage of such 
a law). Similar problems have arisen under statutory presumptions concerning parenthood, 
and have been similarly resolved in favor of same sex couples. See Gartner v. Iowa Dept. 
of Pub. Health, 830 N.W. 3d 335 (Iowa 2013) (holding that Iowa statute regarding 
presumption of parentage for non-birthing parent must be extended to non-birthing lesbian 
mother). Professor NeJaime has been writing at the cutting edge of these developments. 
See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2630748 (arguing that parental rights should flow from intent and function, rather than  
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not to say that discrimination by state actors on the basis of sexual 
orientation is a thing of the past. Rather, I am asserting that no court would 
find any constitutionally legitimate basis for any formal policy of exclusion, 
based on sexual orientation, from state created opportunities. Whether the 
policy is based on prejudice, animus,22 or sincere religious belief, it rests on 
reasons that the state is forbidden to pursue. Governmental policies driven 
by prejudice or animosity violate the Equal Protection Clause, 23  and 
governmental policies that rest exclusively on religious propositions violate 
the Establishment Clause.24 
Second, whatever the possible role of religious liberty as a counterforce 
to LGBT equality in the private sector, to be discussed below, the individual 
religious liberty of public officials cannot provide a mandatory counterforce 
to their legal duties. The litigation involving Rowan County (KY) Clerk 
Kim Davis25 represents the most prominent illustration of this proposition. 
Soon   after   the   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in   Obergefell, Ms. Davis 
announced that her office would no longer issue marriage licenses to any 
couple, same sex or otherwise.26 In an attempt to justify this policy, Ms. 
Davis relied on her Apostolic Christian belief that marriage was limited to a 
union of a man and a woman. 27  Two same-sex and two opposite-sex 
couples sued Ms. Davis in her individual and official capacity. All members 
of the four couples were residents of Rowan County, and they asserted that 
the refusal of Ms. Davis to permit her office to issue marriage licenses 
violated   the   plaintiffs’   rights   under   the   14th Amendment, as construed in 
Obergefell.28                                                                                                                                              
from biology); Douglas NeJaime, Griswold’s  Progeny,  Assisted  Reproduction, Procreative 
Liberty, and Sexual Orientation Equality, 124 YALE L.J. F. 340 (2015), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/griswolds-progeny. 
22  For an astute account of the role of animus in the enactment of the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act, see Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183 (2013). 
23  Romer, 517 U.S. at 631; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432 (1985); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (involving equal protection component of 
the  Fifth  Amendment’s  Due  Process  Clause). 
24  McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97, 106 (1968). 
25  Miller v. Davis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105822 (E.D. KY, Aug. 12, 2015) (granting 
preliminary   injunction,   requiring   County   Clerk’s   Office   to   remain   open   for   granting  
marriage licenses to legally eligible couples).  
26  Id. at 2. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. at 16-17. 
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U.S. District Court Judge Bunning agreed entirely with the plaintiffs, 
and granted them preliminary injunctive relief.29 His opinion identifies the 
sources  of  Clerk  Davis’  duties  to  the  plaintiffs  as  the  14th Amendment, state 
law specifications of the duties of the County Clerk with respect to marriage 
licenses,  and  Kentucky  Governor  Steve  Beshear’s  order  to  County  Clerks  to  
comply fully with the result in Obergefell. Judge Bunning completely 
rejected   Davis’   assertion that the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment empowers her to follow her religious beliefs and close her 
office to couples seeking to marry. As Judge Bunning noted, the Free 
Exercise Clause does not protect persons, as individuals or as public 
employees, against generally applicable rules that incidentally burden 
religious exercise.30 All of the legal norms to which Ms. Davis is subject – 
the  federal  Constitution,  relevant  state  statutes,  and  the  Governor’s  Order  – 
are generally applicable; they do not target religious objectors in any way.31 
Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle her to any 
accommodation from her legal duties, and certainly does not authorize the 
closing of her office to marriage license applicants. 
When Ms. Davis refused to comply with the injunction, Judge Bunning 
held her in contempt and ordered her jailed until she agreed to not impede 
her deputies in the discharge of their duties to couples seeking marriage 
licenses.32 Even after Ms. Davis was released from jail, she defaced license 
                                                        
29  Id. at 42. 
30  Id. at 24-25 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
31  Id. at 27-31.   Judge  Bunning   also   rejected  Ms.  Davis’   argument   that   the  plaintiffs’  
rights were not violated because they could obtain a license to marry in another County. He 
reasoned that there was no guarantee that all other County Clerks would comply with 
Obergefell, and in any event plaintiffs should not be burdened with the expense and 
inconvenience of having to travel to obtain something to which county residents have a 
legal right. Id. at 17-18.  Judge  Bunning  also  rejected  Davis’  other  defenses,  based  on U.S. 
CONST., Art.   VI,   cl.   3   (barring   “religious   Tests”   for   federal   office),   id. at 36-38, and 
Kentucky RFRA, id. at 38-41. The prohibition on religious tests is inapt to the case of Ms. 
Davis, because the state and county are not basing qualifications for office on religious 
beliefs;;   the   government’s   only   concern   is   that   the   County   Clerk   carry   out   her   official  
duties, or at least not impede others in her office from carrying out those duties. Kentucky 
RFRA, whatever it may require as an accommodation for Ms. Davis, cannot trump the 
state’s   and   county’s   federal   constitutional   duties.  U.S.  CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (making the 
U.S.  Constitution  and  other  federal  laws  the  “supreme  Law  of  the  Land.”) 
32  Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail over Deal on Same-
Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-
davis-same-sex-marriage.html. 
2015] Moving Targets 9 
 
 
forms in order to remove her name and the name of her office from them.33 
Although her office has now resumed the issuance of marriage licenses, 
legal and cultural controversy continues to swirl around Ms. Davis.34 
Under some circumstances, state law may permit (or even require) 
religious accommodation of public employees, so long as the 
accommodation is fully respectful of the rights and interests of others. Ms. 
Davis, however, was not seeking a narrow accommodation for herself, with 
full scope for official recognition of same-sex marriage. Rather, she was 
trying to close her office to such marriages, and she was asserting a 
religious justification for that complete closure. However attractive Ms. 
Davis may be as a political martyr to those who continue to oppose same 
sex marriage on religious grounds, her legal position is entirely 
indefensible. Government itself may not assert a religious identity,35 and so 
is constitutionally barred from relying on religious beliefs in defending any 
policy of discrimination. Moreover, officers and employees of government 
are subject to duties to provide equal respect to all citizens, regardless of 
                                                        
33  For  a  careful  report  of  Ms.  Davis’  attempts  to  interfere  with  the  marriage  licensing  
function of her Office, see Marty Lederman, Don’t  be  surprised  if  Kim  Davis  is  remanded  
to the custody of the federal marshal – again, BALKIN.BLOGSPOT.COM (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/09/dont-be-surprised-if-kim-davis-is.html. An additional 
motion,  designed  to  limit  Ms.  Davis’  ability  to  deface  or  alter  the  licensing  forms,  is  now  
pending in front of Judge Bunning. The motion is available at Motion to Enforce 
September 3 and September 8 Orders, JUSTSECURITY.ORG, https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/miller.plaintiffs.motion.enforce.orders.pdf (last visited Oct. 
28, 2015). 
34  See, e.g., Brandon Ambrosino, The Shady Group That Played Pope Francis, THE 
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/10/05/the-shady-
group-that-played-pope-francis.html (analyzing the role of Liberty Counsel in arranging for 
and publicizing the interaction between Pope Francis and Kim Davis). 
35  This is a core command of the First  Amendment’s  Establishment  Clause. For full 
explication of this concept, see IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR 
GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 26-29, 160-63 (2014). 
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sexual orientation or gender identity.36 Ms. Davis acted in defiance of all 
relevant legal norms.37  
The extreme and indefensible legal position of Kim Davis should not 
blind us to the possibility of softer accommodations for religiously 
objecting employees. In the wake of Obergefell, Attorney General Ken 
Paxton   of   Texas   issued   a   formal   opinion   concerning   the   “[r]ights   of  
government officials involved with issuing same-sex marriage licenses and 
conducting same-sex  wedding  ceremonies.”38 Relying on state and federal 
law, the Attorney   General   concluded   that   “county clerks and their employees retain religious freedoms that may provide for certain accommodations of their religious objections to issuing same-sex marriage licenses--or issuing licenses at all, but the strength of any particular	  accommodation	  claim	  depends	  upon	  the	  facts.”39  
Insofar as the Attorney General is relying on the federal Free Exercise 
Clause, federal RFRA, or federal employment law, his conclusion is 
completely unwarranted. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
confers no rights on state or local officials to resist or be exempt from those 
generally applicable legal duties.40 If probate court judges, county clerks, or 
other state officials object to cooperating in same sex marriages, the federal                                                         
36  For a full explication of this proposition in light of Obergefell, see Memorandum 
from Public/Rights Private Conscience Project (Columbia University School of Law) to 
Interested Parties (June 30, 2015), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/marriage_exemptions_memo_june_30.pdf. 
An important post-Obergefell application of this principle in the context of judicial ethics 
appears in Supreme Court of Ohio, Judicial Performance of Civil Marriages by Same Sex 
Couples, EQUALITY CASE FILES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://files.eqcf.org/cases/ohio-supreme-
court-advisory-on-performance-of-civil-marriages/. 
37  Ms. Davis can be defended only by a claim that Obergefell is an illegitimate 
usurpation of judicial power that should be resisted by public officials. See, e.g., Statement 
Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v. Hodges, AMERICAN PRINCIPLES 
PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2015), https://americanprinciplesproject.org/founding-principles/ 
statement-calling-for-constitutional-resistance-to-obergefell-v-hodges%E2%80%AF/. 
38  Memorandum from Attorney General Ken Paxton to Governor Dan Patrick (June 
28, 2015), available at https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/ 
op/2015/kp0025.pdf [hereinafter Paxton Opinion]. For a briefer opinion to similar effect, 
see Memorandum from Thomas Enright, Executive Counsel to Office of [Louisiana] 
Governor Bobby Jindal (June 29, 2015), available at http://gov.louisiana.gov/ 
index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=5012. 
39  Paxton Opinion, supra note 38, at 4. The opinion reached a similar conclusion with 
respect to judges who have authority to conduct marriage ceremonies, but added the 
important legal proposition that judges (unlike clerks) have no statutory duty to conduct 
such ceremonies for anyone. Id. at 5. 
40  Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990). 
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Constitution cannot help them. Nor can federal RFRA, which does not 
apply to the duties imposed by state and local government, and which in 
any event cannot trump federal constitutional norms. Moreover, state law 
cannot supersede any protection of LGBT equality imposed by federal law, 
especially federal constitutional law.41 
Only with respect to the possibility of a discretionary accommodation 
under Texas RFRA does Attorney   General   Paxton’s   opinion rest on 
plausible grounds. Texas may choose to accommodate public employees 
whose religious convictions are in conflict with their official duties. For 
example, public employees may be given days or hours off from work in 
order to observe religious holidays. All such accommodations are 
permissive rather than constitutionally mandatory, however, and are strictly 
bounded by federal constitutional concerns. Under the Establishment 
Clause, any such permissive accommodation must not inflict significant 
harm on third parties, 42  and must in any event fully respect the 
constitutional right recognized in Obergefell – that   is   the   “right  under   the  
Fourteenth Amendment for same sex couples to be married on the same 
terms   as   accorded   to   couples   of   the   opposite   sex.” 43  Accordingly, the 
constitutional permissibility of any accommodation of objecting employees 
will turn on whether the accommodation can be executed without material 
or dignitary harm to same sex couples.44 Any such accommodation must be 
designed to avoid insult or discriminatory delay in the processing of 
licenses. An attempt to accommodate public employees, in Texas or 
elsewhere,  that  does  not  respect  this  “no  harm” principle is constitutionally 
doomed. 
Federal statutory law. At present, federal statutory law contains very 
few explicit prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity. Recent federal legislative proposals would, if successful,                                                         
41  This is the command of the Supremacy Clause in U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
42  See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 708-09 (1985); see generally Lupu 
& Tuttle, supra note 35, at 216-247.  
43  Paxton Opinion, supra note 38, at 2. Similar language appears in Obergefell, 135 
S.Ct.  at  2605  (“[T]he  State  laws  challenged  .  .  .  in  these  cases  are  now  held  invalid  to the 
extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and 
conditions as opposite-sex  couples.”)  (emphasis  added). 
44  For example, recent Utah legislation (discussed further in Part III infra) 
accommodates the religious freedom of individual public employees while guaranteeing 
equal access for all to public offices and officials who deal with marriage. S.B. 297, 61st 
Leg. Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/ 
SB0297.html. 
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radically change that state of affairs, 45  but enactment of any of these 
proposals is unlikely in the current, Republican-dominated Congress. As of 
this writing, the Violence Against Women Act is the only federal statute 
that explicitly forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity.46 
For now, the relevant conflicts between federal statutory rights47 and 
religious freedom arise from the repeal or disappearance of federal laws that 
mandated discrimination against members of the LGBT community. I refer 
principally  to  the  repeal  of  “Don’t  Ask,  Don’t  Tell,”48 which has ended the 
exclusion from the Armed Forces of those who are openly gay or lesbian, 
and the invalidation in U.S. v. Windsor of Section 3 of the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act, which excluded valid same sex marriages from all federal 
recognition. The elimination of these barriers to federally created 
opportunities has invited new possibilities for religious freedom objections 
to obligations under federal law. 
1. Integration of the Armed Forces. The repeal  of  “Don’t  Ask,  Don’t  
Tell”  has led to the open integration of the Armed Forces with respect to 
sexual orientation. That change has produced conflict with assertions of                                                         
45  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. As discussed in Part II.B. infra, serious 
consideration of these proposals would invite a variety of counter-proposed religious 
exemptions.  
46  Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (b)(13)(A) (2012). In addition, the 
Mathew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 
249, makes it a federal crime to commit an act of physical violence that is motivated by, 
among other characteristics, the actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of 
the victim.  
47  Other, non-statutory sources of federal law currently include LGBT anti-
discrimination provisions. See infra notes 121-125 and accompanying text. In addition, 
federal regulations in specified contexts extend antidiscrimination norms to LGBT persons. 
See, e.g. George Gonzalez, HUD Issues Guidance on Multifamily Assisted and Insured 
Housing based on Equal Access to Housing Rule, HUD.GOV (July 13, 2015), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2015/H
UDNo_15-086. 
48  See Don’t  Ask,  Don’t  Tell  Repeal  Act  of  2010,  Pub.  L.  No.  111-321 (repealing 10 
U.S.C. § 654). Discrimination against transgendered persons in the armed forces continued 
after the repeal. See Juliet Eilperin, Transgender in the Military: A Pentagon in Transition 
Weighs its Policy, WASHINGTON POST (April 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/transgender-in-the-military-a-pentagon-in-transition-weighs-its-policy/2015/04/09/ 
ee0ca39e-cf0d-11e4-8c54-ffb5ba6f2f69_story.html?postshare=9481428673479708. The 
Armed Forces are now changing their policies. See Sandhya Somashekhar and Craig 
Whitlock, Military to Allow Transgender Members to Serve Openly, WASHINGTON POST 
(July 16, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pentagon-to-allow-transgender-
members-to-serve-openly/2015/07/13/fe9b054a-298d-11e5-a5ea-cf74396e59ec_story.html. 
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religious liberty by some chaplains, who have objected to officiating at 
same sex weddings, counseling same sex spouses or partners within the 
military, and counseling LGBT servicemen and servicewomen on matters 
related to their sexual identities.49 As Professor Tuttle and I have explained 
elsewhere, military chaplains have a dual role.50 They are endorsed by their 
particular faith community as ordained or approved clergy, and in that 
capacity they preside over worship services and sacraments within their 
faith. When acting in that role, chaplains may follow the dictates of their 
faith when deciding how to worship, and who is entitled to particular 
sacraments. Accordingly, a chaplain may refuse to perform any marriage 
ceremony, including one involving a same sex couple, if that ceremony is 
not  consistent  with  the  chaplain’s  faith. 
Military chaplains, however, have a distinct role as officers responsible 
for the spiritual welfare of all service members in their units.51 In that role, 
chaplains are obliged to provide counsel and direction – either themselves 
or by appropriate referral to others -- to members of every faith. This is an 
essential  part  of  the  chaplain’s  official  mission,  necessary  to  guarantee   that 
all who serve in the Armed Forces have equal and sufficient access to 
spiritual resources.52 Accordingly, chaplains are obliged to counsel openly 
gay and lesbian members of the Armed Forces, even with respect to matters 
that touch on same-sex intimacy. 53  Allowing exemptions to objecting                                                         
49  The most prominent controversy in this regard has involved Navy Lt. Cmdr. Wesley 
Modder,   who   faces   discipline   by   the   U.S.   Navy   “for allegedly scolding sailors for 
homosexuality   and   premarital   sex.” See Andrew Tighman, Chaplain Faces Possible 
Discharge   for   Being   ‘Intolerant’, MILITARY TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), 
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/03/10/chaplain-fired/24699275. Some 
Members of Congress have proposed a Military Religious Freedom Protection Act, 
designed to protect military chaplains and others against being required to cooperate with 
or assist LGBT members of the Armed Forces. H.R. 914, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/914. Congress did not enact the 
proposal. See Howard Friedman, President Objects to House Passed LGBT Related 
Provisions, RELIGION CLAUSE (May 24, 2012, 7:05 AM), http://religionclause.blogspot. 
com/2012/05/president-objects-to-house-passed.html. 
50  LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 35, at 251-262; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. VA. 
L. REV. 89, 132 (2007). 
51  Id. at 119. 
52  Id. 
53  If a chaplain offered marital or couples counseling limited to members of her faith 
community, this would justify exclusion of all couples, same sex or otherwise, from outside 
that community. But if the couples counseling were not so restricted, exclusion of same sex 
couples would be discrimination, pure and simple, based on sexual orientation. 
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chaplains from such an obligation would undercut the government’s  interest  
in providing equal access to spiritual resources, especially if other chaplains 
were unavailable. 
A chaplain’s   assertion   of   rights   under   federal  RFRA   should not alter 
this outcome.   First,   it   may   not   be   a   “substantial   burden”   on   a   chaplain’s  
religious exercise to compel him to counsel all who seek help. Outside the 
role of chaplain in a public institution, ordained clergy are of course free to 
minister or refuse to minister as they choose. Within such institutions, 
however, the dictates of the role require service to all, and the claim that 
such service is a religious burden seems quite inconsistent with the 
chaplain’s   commission,   voluntarily   accepted. Even if, arguendo, the 
obligation to counsel all is religiously   burdensome,   the   government’s  
refusal to provide a RFRA exemption to a complaining chaplain should be 
upheld  under  RFRA’s  terms. The government has a very strong interest in 
providing equal and adequate resources to all who serve. In some situations, 
the government may have an alternative chaplain available, but that will not 
always be the case – a particular ship or base may have very few chaplains 
for all who serve there. And even if alternatives are available, the refusal by 
a chaplain to serve a particular member of the Armed Forces may inflict 
indignities that the government has a strong interest in preventing. 
To put the matter differently -- chaplains acting in their role as spiritual 
advisers to all within their zone of responsibility are officers of the United 
States. The   equal   protection   component   of   the   Fifth   Amendment’s   Due  
Process Clause54 mandates that chaplains treat all Members of the Armed 
Forces with equal respect, and prohibits invidious discrimination against 
any of them. That chaplains are also ordained clergy, with a separate and 
distinct role with respect to those in their own faith community, does not 
insulate chaplains from the dictates of the Constitution. 
2. Federal recognition of same sex marriages. Prior to Windsor, 
section 3 of DOMA excluded same sex married couples from federal rights, 
benefits, and obligations triggered by marital status. Windsor invalidated 
that statutory exclusion.  
The erasure of DOMA’s   effect   has   catapulted   federally   mandated  
rights for same sex married couples into the private sector. For prominent 
example, the Family and Medical Leave Act (hereafter  “FMLA”)   requires                                                         
54  U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct 2679, 2693 (2013) (holding the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment requires invalidation of DOMA, section 3). For an earlier iteration of the 
concept   of   an   “equal   protection   component”   to   the   Fifth   Amendment,   see Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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covered private employers to make available a period of unpaid leave for 
employees whose spouse, child, or parent has a serious medical problem.55 
In February of 2015, in light of Windsor, the U.S. Department of Labor 
announced a rule that amends the definition of spouse so that eligible 
employees in same-sex marriages are now eligible to take FMLA leave to 
care for a spouse.56 
Suppose a private employer asserts a RFRA objection to extending 
such a leave, related to a spousal illness, to an employee in a valid same-sex 
marriage. The employer does not want to fire this employee because of his 
or her sexual orientation, but objects to being compelled by federal law to 
recognize the marriage as valid. At a superficial glance, the structure of this 
claim seems similar to that advanced in Hobby Lobby – a business 
enterprise would be making a religious objection to being implicated, by 
granting a leave of absence with a right to return to the position, in 
recognition of a relationship that the employer views as religiously 
unacceptable, both in its sexual component and in its claim to full respect as 
a marriage.57                                                         
55  FMLA covers private sector employers who employ fifty or more employees for at 
least 20 workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) 
(2012). Another federal statutory context in which similar issues about recognition of same 
sex marriages may appear is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which 
includes protections for surviving spouses of persons with private pension plans. See 29 
U.S.C.§ 1055 (a)(2) (2012). 
56  Federal Job-Protected Family and Medical Leave Rights Extended to Eligible 
Workers in Same-Sex Marriages, DOL.GOV (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/ 
opa/media/press/whd/WHD20150285.htm. The Rule itself is 29 C.F.R. § 825.102 (2015).  
57  There is nothing far-fetched about this hypothetical. For example, when Illinois 
legislated the validity of same sex marriage, a number of religious liberty advocates 
proposed legislative provisions that would permit objecting employers to refuse to 
recognize same sex marriages as valid for purposes of the employment relationship. See 
Letter from Thomas C. Berg, et al., to Representative Christopher Donovan (Apr. 20, 
2009), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/letter-to-rep.-donovan-re-bill-899-
04-20-09.pdf (citing letter to Illinois lawmakers and other, similar letters to lawmakers in 
other states). For an exposition of the views opposing such provisions in the Illinois 
legislation, see Dale Carpenter, et al., Religious Liberty and Marriage for Same-Sex 
Couples, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/ 
files/five-law-professors-against-changing-sb-10.pdf (containing letter from legal scholars, 
myself included, responding to the arguments made by the proponents of these provisions). 
In its law ending discrimination in marriage against same sex couples, the Illinois 
legislature did not enact any exemptions for commercial businesses in their employment or 
customer service obligations. Id. In the spring of 2015, the Louisiana legislature considered 
a Bill that contained such religion-based exemptions. See H.B. 707, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(La. 2015), available at http://media.nola.com/politics/other/Religious%20Freedom%  
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Although  the  Court’s  opinion  in  Hobby Lobby appears to have left such 
questions open, I think it highly unlikely that the employer would prevail. 
The arguments in such a dispute are worth unpacking in detail, because they 
will track many of the arguments in any comparable case in which RFRA-
based rights (federal or state) are advanced against the protections of 
employment law. The arguments are likely to fall into the categories of 1) 
the employer-objector’s   religious   sincerity;;   2)   whether   the   FMLA  
obligation imposes a substantial burden on the employer-objector’s  
religious  exercise;;  3)  the  weight  of  the  government’s  interest  in  denying  an  
exemption to FMLA to the employer-objector; and 4) whether the 
government has alternative ways to satisfy its interest in the employee 
obtaining the relevant benefits under FMLA. Let’s  consider  these,  one-by-
one, in the terms in which they are likely to be contested.  
Religious sincerity. This is a potential threshold question in every 
religious exemption case. Like the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA protects 
only sincere religious beliefs,58 not other kinds of beliefs, sincere or not, 
masquerading as religious. In our hypothetical FMLA dispute, the employer 
will offer whatever evidence may be available to him on this question – for 
example, membership in a church that teaches the sinfulness of same sex 
intimacy, and/or consistent and demonstrated adherence by the employer to 
that principle. The employee may challenge the veracity or credibility of 
that evidence. The employee may also offer evidence of inconsistent 
statements  or  conduct,   including  perhaps   the  employer’s  social acceptance 
of the   employee’s spousal relationship (for example, by invitation of the 
spouse to an office holiday party). 
Not so long ago, a claim that opposition to same sex marriage was 
religiously sincere would have been met with a completely non-skeptical 
response, by courts or otherwise. At a moment of great social change and 
cultural agitation on issues of same sex intimacy, including ferment within 
many religious communities, we may be entering a period of increased 
skepticism about whether any particular employer – especially a secular, 
commercial, for-profit employer – is acting out of sincere religious                                                                                                                                             
20bill%20(1).pdf (original version). I discuss the Louisiana proposal, which was not 
enacted, in Part III.B., infra. 
58  U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (finding Free Exercise Clause protects 
only sincere religious belief, and juries may appraise sincerity when relevant). The 
sincerity requirement applies similarly in generic statutory protections of religious liberty. 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774, n. 28 (stating that RFRA requires sincere religious 
belief); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (stating that protection under RLUIPA 
requires sincere religious belief). 
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conviction, or reflexive, homophobic bigotry. This will rarely be an easy 
question, though the evidence may push one way or the other – for example, 
does the employer treat LGBT employees with personal respect, or is he 
tolerant of nasty and disrespectful slurs? Tolerance of hateful treatment 
suggests bigoted animus, not religious disapproval. 
Over time, I suspect that employees, administrative agencies, and 
reviewing courts in this sort of situation may become increasingly 
disinclined   to   accept   the   employer’s   word   on   the   question   of   religious  
sincerity. Needless to say, putting this issue in dispute may be personal and 
ugly, and yet simultaneously necessary to weed out non-meritorious claims 
at the threshold. Moreover, this sort of inquiry incentivizes respectful 
treatment of all employees. An employer who wants respect for his 
religious convictions about sexual orientation would be wise to police 
derogatory name-calling and harassment of LGBT employees in the 
workplace. As religious opposition to same-sex intimacy wanes over time 
and space, decision-makers might appropriately adopt a rebuttable 
presumption that anti-gay attitudes are not religiously sincere.59  
Substantial burden. The trigger for federal RFRA (and most or all state 
RFRAs)  is  a  showing  that  the  RFRA  claimant’s  religious  exercise  has  been  
substantially burdened. What would the asserted burden be in our 
hypothetical FMLA dispute? I would expect the objecting employer to 
argue that the obligation to grant a leave, even without pay, to the employee 
to care for his same sex spouse represents a recognition of  the  employee’s  
marital status, to which the employer has a religious objection. 
Does Hobby Lobby foreclose a judicial interrogation of that claim of 
burden? The employer in Hobby Lobby objected to inclusion of certain 
contraceptives in the employer-provided health insurance plan, on the 
grounds that the inclusion made the employer complicit in the use of those 
contraceptives. 60  However attenuated that seems to some, 61  the Court 
                                                        
59  A comparable skepticism attached almost immediately to claims that religious 
principles animated policies of racial exclusion in public accommodation. See generally 
James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal 
Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 99, 105-110 (2015). The leading decision, summarily rejecting a  claim of 
religious exemption from public accommodation laws in matters of race, is Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968). 
60  For analysis of the increasingly broad role of complicity claims in the jurisprudence 
of religious freedom, see Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: 
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2202 (2015). 
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concluded that it could not second-guess  the  employer’s  assertion  that   this  
kind  of  complicity  violated  the  employer’s  religious  conscience. That claim 
of complicity seems similar, though not identical, to the claim of a baker or 
photographer to refrain from providing goods or services to a same sex 
wedding – that is to say, to facilitating a particular practice.  
In contrast, a RFRA objection to a leave to care for a spouse is not 
aimed at a particular practice. Rather, the objection is broader and far more 
troubling, because its target is a relationship, an ongoing status protected in 
many ways by law. If the employer, acting on religious grounds, can treat a 
marriage as invalid, the employer can presumptively exclude the spouse 
from all benefits that federal law requires private employers to provide to 
employees’  spouses – for example, notifications or pension benefits under a 
private, ERISA-regulated pension plan.62  
It is difficult to see how this kind of claim of a religious burden could 
be limited to same sex marriages. Why would it not also extend to other 
marriages to which the employer had religious objection (e.g., inter-racial, 
inter-faith, purely secular), or to parent-child relationships to which the 
employer had religious objections (e.g., a child born out of wedlock, or 
through some form of assisted reproduction)? An employer might assert 
that any of these relationships are unnatural, disordered, contrary  to  God’s  
plan, or evil.63 These kinds of objections, to status rather than acts, extend 
far beyond any singular act of ‘sinful”  behavior, and are sweepingly hostile 
to the life plans of those whose family connections are being denied.  
Although objections to recognition of status are likely to have greater 
legal and emotional consequences than objections to facilitation of acts, the 
wholly individualized and utterly subjective character of religious 
conscience, as validated in Hobby Lobby,64 makes it logically impossible (at                                                                                                                                             
61  See Abner Greene, Religious Freedom and (other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle 
Ground, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 185 (2015)   (arguing   that   burden   on   employer’s  
religious exercise was too attenuated to be substantial within the meaning of RFRA).  
62  See supra note 55. 
63  See Heather Knight, Archbishop Salvatore   Cordileone   Spells   Out   Schools’   Sex  
Doctrine, SFGATE (Feb. 3, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SF-
archbishop-clarifies-sexual-doctrine-for-high-6060293.php. 
64  134 S. Ct. at 2777-2779 (citing Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana, 450 U.S. 707, 
715 (1981)) (concluding that in Free Exercise Clause cases, courts may not second-guess 
the   accuracy,   consistency,   or   credibility   of   the   claimants’   religious   beliefs).   Professor  
Tuttle and I have argued that Thomas is correct in concluding that government officials are 
constitutionally incompetent to appraise the religious significance of a practice. See LUPU 
& TUTTLE, supra note 35, at 226-32. We see this disability, however, as a reason to be 
deeply skeptical of RFRA as a matter of policy, and to construe it narrowly when (in a case  
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the  “burden”  phase) to distinguish between acts and status.65 Unfortunately, 
this means that all religious objections to a legal obligation to act 
supportively toward same sex marriage will trigger the demanding tests of 
“compelling  governmental  interest”  and  “least  restrictive  means.” 
Compelling interest in denying the exemption. Suppose that, for the 
reasons just advanced, a court finds that compliance with FMLA with 
respect  to  a  same  sex  spouse  substantially  burdens  an  employer’s  religious 
exercise. That   doesn’t   end   the   case,   but   it   does   immediately place 
formidable obstacles in the legal path of opponents of the RFRA claim. 
What   is   the   quality   and  weight   of   the   government’s   interest   in   denying   a 
RFRA exemption to the FMLA?  
The question is more complex than it first appears. The most 
straightforward answer averts to the policies that led to enactment of the 
FMLA – that is, to protect employees from adverse job consequences that 
arise from their own medical needs, or (as in our hypothetical case) the 
medical needs of close family members. Some of these needs may be 
voluntary, such as those arising from a wanted pregnancy, but most are not 
– they involve some form of illness or injury to a family member, and the 
corresponding pressure on an employee to take time off from work to care 
for that family member. The government interests here include work-family 
balance, economic security, and integrity of families.66  The government                                                                                                                                             
like Hobby Lobby) it otherwise will do harm. See id. at 237-247. See also Ira C. Lupu & 
Robert W. Tuttle, Religious Questions and Saving Constructions, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 
2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-religious-questions-
and-saving-constructions/. 
65  Although  RFRA  claimants  get  to  define  their  own  “religious  exercise,”  courts  must  
decide whether the challenged law pressures or coerces them to alter their religious 
exercise. For application of this principle in the context of the accommodation of non-profit 
employers with respect to the contraceptive mandate, see Little Sisters of the Poor Home 
for  the  Aged  v.  Burwell,  2015  WL  4232096  (10th  Cir.  2015);;  Geneva  Coll.  v.  Sec’y  U.S.  
Dep’t   of  Health  &  Human  Serv.,   778  F.3d   422   (3d  Cir.   2015);;  Univ.   of  Notre  Dame   v.  
Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015); East Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 2015 U.S. 
App.   LEXIS   10513   (5th   Cir.   2015);;   Priests   for   Life   v.   U.S.   Dep’t   of   Health   &  Human  
Services, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh’g   en   banc   denied, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 
8326 (D.C. Cir. 2015). On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
these five cases and two others raising the same issues, and consolidated all seven cases 
under the caption Zubik v. Burwell (No. 14-1418), 577 U.S. ___ (2015). For an excellent 
analysis of the issues raised by these decisions, see Martin Lederman, Update on the 
Contraceptive Coverage Regulations and Litigation, BALKANIZATION (July 20, 2015), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/07/update-on-contraception-coverage.html. 
66  See Family & Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 2601 (b)(1) (1993) (stating purposes 
of  Act  are  “to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote  
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interests also include, more subtly, the social and personal value of family 
care as compared to no care, or care by strangers, for someone who has 
significant medical needs; gender equality; eradication of sex stereotypes 
about who does the caring; and peace of mind for an employee, who would 
otherwise fear losing his or her job because of family needs to stay at home 
and provide care. 
A RFRA exemption from FMLA for employers who object to same sex 
marriages would deprive the affected employees and their families of the 
benefit of up to 12 weeks per calendar year of such leave, without pay but 
with the right to return to the job without loss of status or seniority. It is 
crucial to note, however, that the exemption is by definition discriminatory; 
the employer is not religiously objecting to marriage, or even to the 
employer’s responsibility to provide a marriage-supportive benefit. Instead, 
the employer is providing leaves with respect to marriages that are 
religiously acceptable to him, and denying it to others.  
Moreover, recognition of a RFRA exemption in a case involving a 
same sex spouse invites the possibility of objection on religious grounds to 
other marriages, including inter-racial and inter-faith marriages. On the 
subjective, individualized religion side of the equation, there is no 
distinction possible among the objections to these various partnerships. To 
be   sure,   objections   based   on   a   marital   partner’s   race   or   religion   would  
violate   Title   VII’s   prohibition   on   discrimination   based   on   such  
characteristics. In such a case, the employer would be demanding a RFRA 
exemption from Title VII as well as from FMLA. The addition of Title VII 
concerns to FMLA concerns adds to the weight   of   the   government’s  
interests in denying a RFRA-based exemption.67 
Because no widely applicable federal statute explicitly prohibits 
discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation,68 employers will                                                                                                                                             
the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in 
preserving family integrity.”) 
67  See id. at § 2601 (b)(4)-(5) (stating purposes of FMLA include promotion of equal 
employment opportunity and non-discrimination). The iconic citation for the proposition 
that anti-discrimination interests trump religious freedom interests is Bob Jones Univ. v. 
U.S., 461 U.S. 474 (1983) (upholding revocation of non-profit tax status of a university 
that prohibited inter-racial dating on campus). The Court in Hobby Lobby cited Bob Jones 
University with approval. 134 S. Ct. at 2783. The government had not argued, however, as 
it might have, that an exception to the contraceptive mandate was a sex discriminatory 
exception, in contravention of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
68  There  is  considerable  current  controversy  concerning  whether  Title  VII’s  prohibition  
on sex discrimination should be construed to include discrimination based on sexual  
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assert that the anti-discrimination interest should not count in the equation 
to the same extent as if the objected-to marriage was inter-racial or inter-
faith. That argument, however, presupposes an overly narrow measure of 
federal interests. Executive Branch action is another important source of 
expression for such interests. A variety of federal policies, emanating from 
the Executive Branch, against discrimination based on sexual orientation 
should contribute to the appraisal of the quality of federal interests. 69 
Accordingly, the anti-discrimination norm – in its focus on material harm as 
well as stigmatic injury – should play an important role in the appraisal of a 
RFRA objection to extending FMLA leave to an employee with a sick or 
injured same sex spouse.  
I recognize fully the manipulability of RFRA’s   terms, including 
“compelling interests.”70 If we are to take this provision seriously, however, 
the government’s arguments that it has compelling interests in denying 
RFRA exemptions to the FMLA, in the case of objection to same sex 
marriage, seem very strong.71  
Availability of   alternative   means   of   satisfying   the   government’s  
interest. Even if a  court  views  the  government’s  interest  as compelling, the 
government will not prevail unless it can show that applying the FMLA to 
the employer   in   this   case   is   the   “least   restrictive   alternative”   to  
accomplishing   the   government’s   interest. In Hobby Lobby, this question 
proved dispositive against the government, because it already had in place 
an accommodation for non-profit religious entities. The Court did not rule 
that the accommodation, which remains under RFRA challenge from                                                                                                                                             
orientation or gender identity. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 81-94 and 
accompanying text. 
69  Exec. Order No. 13087, 63 Fed Reg. 30097 (May 28, 1998) available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/executiveorders/13087.cfm; Exec Order No. 13672, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 42971 (July 21, 2015) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-07-
23/pdf/2014-17522.pdf (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity in federal employment and employment by federal contractors).  
70  A great deal of the argument in Lupu, supra note 11, is devoted to the proposition 
that  all  of  RFRA’s  terms  are  extremely  vague  and  malleable.   
71  Although the FMLA covers only employers with fifty or more employees, this 
formula reflects competing interests of smaller employers, who will have more difficulty 
granting leaves with a right to return, than employers with a larger work force. The formula 
does   not   reflect   any   judgment   about   the   strength   or  weakness   of   employees’   interests   in  
obtaining family or medical leave. Cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (refusing to treat 
coverage   formula   in  ACA  dispositive   of   the   “compelling   interest”   question.) For further 
discussion of this important point about the relationship between under-inclusion in 
coverage and the weight of government interests, see Lupu, supra note 11, at 82-86.  
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religious non-profits, 72 was itself lawful as applied to all religious non-
profits. Nevertheless, a five Justice majority concluded that the 
accommodation revealed the availability of an alternative that would 1) 
satisfy   the   government’s   interest   in   providing   access   to   all   contraceptives  
and 2) be less restrictive of religious liberty than the mandate challenged by 
Hobby Lobby and other for-profit entities.73 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s  recent decision in Holt v. Hobbs74 reinforces 
the  importance  of  the  “least  restrictive  alternative”  standard  in cases brought under 
general religious liberty statutes. Holt involved   a  Muslim   prison   inmate’s   claim  
under the  Religious  Land  Use  and  Institutionalized  Persons  Act  (“RLUIPA”)  that 
Arkansas prison officials had forbidden him to grow a beard, in violation of his 
obligations as a Muslim man. Among other issues, the Court emphasized that the 
official concern that prisoners might hide contraband could be satisfied by means 
far less restrictive of religious freedom than forcing the inmate to shave—for 
example, requiring him to regularly run a comb through his beard at the request of 
prison guards. RFRA and the RLUIPA provisions concerning institutionalized 
persons are   framed   in   identical   terms   of   “substantial   burden,”   “compelling  
government   interest,”   and   “least restrictive   alternative,”   and the Holt opinion 
accordingly cited the recent Hobby Lobby decision as authority for the proper 
interpretation of all those terms.75 
Despite  the  force  of  the  “least  restrictive  alternative”  standard  in  Hobby 
Lobby and Holt, this element of RFRA will not save our employer in the 
hypothetical FMLA case. The government has made no special 
accommodation for other religious objectors, so the employer cannot point 
to any such policy and demand its extension. Most significantly, interests 
that FMLA is designed to serve–familial care for the sick or injured, 
employee security with respect to keeping a job in time of emergency, and 
gender equality–cannot be satisfied with any feasible alternative.                                                          
72  See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame, 786 F.3d 606, cert. granted sub nom. Zubik v. 
Burwell (No. 14-1418), 577 U.S. ___ (2015); East Texas Baptist Univ. 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10513, cert. granted sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell (No. 14-1418), 577 U.S. ___ 
(2015); Priests for Life, 772 F.3d 229, cert. granted sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell (No. 14-
1418), 577 U.S. ___ (2015). 
73  In July 2015, the Obama Administration promulgated a Rule extending the 
accommodation to closely held, for profit corporations. See Coverage of Preventive 
Services under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41317 (Aug. 14, 2015). The major 
substantive question involved in the Rulemaking was the criteria for which companies will 
be  considered  “closely  held”  and  therefore  eligible  for  any  new  accommodation  offered  to  
firms organized for profit. Id. at 22-35. 
74  Holt, 135 S.Ct. 853. 
75  Id. at 859-63.  
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Of course, in theory the government could always make itself the 
employer of last resort for every covered employee whose employer makes 
a religious objection. If and when the employer denies an otherwise 
appropriate FMLA leave request, the employee would contact the 
government, and it would hire him on the spot to work at the same or better 
wages when the covered FMLA period expires, or when the emergency 
ends, whichever is sooner. Or the government would pay the dismissed 
employee his wages plus the value of lost fringe benefits until he can find a 
job equivalent to the one he lost.  
I suspect that the readers of this article can instantly see how ridiculous 
this argument is. The government stepping in as an employer of last resort 
is an alternative to imposing any and all labor standards on religiously 
objecting employers, whether the objection is to family leave, minimum 
wages, maximum hours, efforts to unionize, non-discrimination on the basis 
of sex, religion, or other job-irrelevant characteristics, and so on. If a 
guarantee of government employment for those who are unlawfully fired, 
discriminated against, or treated in substandard ways counts as   a   “least  
restrictive   alternative”   under RFRA, then there will always be a relevant 
option “less   restrictive”   of   religious   liberty   than   full imposition of the 
relevant labor laws.76 
RFRA cannot plausibly be construed this way. The predecessor free 
exercise law on which RFRA was based never suggested anything so 
extreme   in   application   of   the   “least   restrictive   means” test. Even if one 
accepts the radical view that   RFRA   incorporates   only   the   “high-water 
mark”  of  prior  free  exercise  law,77 as displayed in Sherbert v. Verner78 and                                                         
76  The best judicial expositions of this problem of regress in the evaluation of 
alternatives are those of Judge Pillard in Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 264-67 and Judge 
Posner in Notre Dame, 786 F.3d at 616-19. Long ago, I played out the scenario of reductio 
ad absurdum in  the  availability  of  “less  restrictive  means,”  through  use  of  the  Biblical  story  
of Abraham and Isaac. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2797 
Before the Subcomm. On Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 102 Cong. 381-83 (1992) (statement of Ira C. Lupu), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/07/13/hear-99-1992.pdf. 
77  For the earliest, strongest, and best-titled presentation of the radical view, see 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 
56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 256 (1995); see also Micah J. Schwartzman, What Did RFRA 
Restore?, BERKLEY CENTER (Sept. 11, 2015), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ 
cornerstone/hobby-lobby-the-ruling-and-its-implications-for-religious-freedom/responses/ 
what-did-rfra-restore; Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger et al., The New Law of 
Religion, SLATE (July 3, 2015, 11:54 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news 
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/07/after_hobby_lobby_there_is_only_rfra_and_that_s_al
l_you_need.html.  
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Wisconsin v. Yoder, 79  no Justice has ever taken the view that the 
government must exhaust all available options, regardless of feasibility, for 
avoiding burdens on religious liberty. 
Hobby Lobby itself, though hinting that the government could itself 
provide the challenged contraceptives directly to affected women, falls back 
on   the   much   more   modest   proposition   that   the   government’s   own  
accommodation of nonprofits reveals the availability of a reasonable less 
restrictive alternative. In a regulatory context, in which FMLA and most 
labor laws reside, there are no reasonable and less restrictive alternatives. 
Direct government provision of the relevant protection for employees will 
almost always be non-feasible and un-administrable. Put more directly, the 
government has a compelling interest in denying a RFRA exemption to 
these sorts of labor regulations, because granting them will generate 
significant losses to regulatory beneficiaries and government cannot 
reasonably step in and replace the lost benefits. 
This proposition is most obvious with respect to anti-discrimination 
laws, which protect against dignitary harms as well as material ones. Even 
if the government offers employment of equivalent value to an employee 
denied FMLA leave to care for a same-sex spouse, the employer has 
insulted  and  demeaned  the  dignity  of  that  employee’s  marriage  commitment  
and family life. No alternative the government might provide can remedy 
that harm.80  
 
II. EMERGING PROHIBITIONS AGAINST LGBT DISCRIMINATION  
IN FEDERAL LAW 
 
 As noted above, federal statutory law currently includes very few 
explicit prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity. Such prohibitions might arise in two ways. First, agencies or courts 
might construe pre-existing statutes, that forbid discrimination based on sex,                                                                                                                                             
78  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
79  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
80  Immediately after the Hobby Lobby decision, Professor Tuttle and I predicted that 
courts would not sustain RFRA objections to anti-discrimination law, whether focused on 
LGBT rights or otherwise. Robert W. Tuttle & Ira Lupu, Hobby Lobby in the Long Run, 
BERKLEY CENTER (July 1, 2014), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/hobby-
lobby-in-the-long-run. The Hobby Lobby opinion characterized the elimination of race 
discrimination in employment as a compelling interest, but conspicuously omitted mention 
of any other categories of discrimination, including that based on sex or religion, as 
similarly compelling. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783. I discuss this in Lupu, supra note 
11, at 93-100. See also infra Part III.C. 
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to cover LGBT discrimination. Second, Congress might enact new laws that 
explicitly forbid LGBT discrimination in various contexts. 
 
A. New Interpretations of Existing Law 
 
On the interpretive front, the EEOC and some lower federal courts 
have advanced the theory that discrimination in employment based on 
LGBT status is a version of unlawful sex discrimination — that is, the 
discrimination is driven by gender-based stereotypes about how men and 
women should act, appear, or interact in their intimate relationships.81 In a 
very recent case before the Commission, involving a federal employee, the 
agency reaffirmed the position that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is a form of sex discrimination, forbidden by Title VII.82 In the 
courts, cases brought on behalf of transgender people83 have thus far fared 
better than those concerning sexual orientation alone,84 although the recent 
EEOC decision suggests that these questions are in considerable flux. 
The notion that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of 
sex discrimination has been around for over twenty years. In Baehr v. 
Lewin,85 the Supreme Court of Hawaii relied on the concept in the context 
of a same sex marriage case brought under the state constitution. Professor 
Koppelman soon thereafter further developed this concept under the 
                                                        
81  Several years ago, the EEOC adopted this as an official position. See Processing 
Complaints of Discrimination by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Federal 
Employees, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/directives/lgbt_complaint_processing 
.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). See also Terveer v. Billington, 34 F.Supp.3d 100 (D.D.C. 
2014). For additional discussion, see Martin Lederman, Why the Law Does Not (and 
Should Not) Allow Religiously Motivated Contractors to Discriminate Against their LGBT 
Employees, CORNERSTONE BLOG (July 31, 2014), http:// berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ 
cornerstone/non-discrimination-executive-order-and-religious-freedom/responses/why-the-
law-does-not-and-should-not-allow-religiously-motivated-contractors-to-discriminate-
against-their-lgbt-employees, archived at http:// perma.cc/5YRW-Z4WY.  
82  Complainant vs. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 
 (E.E.O.C. 2015). For immediate commentary on the ruling, see Dale Carpenter, Anti-gay 
Discrimination is Sex Discrimination, Says the EEOC, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 16, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/16/anti-gay- 
discrimination-is-sex-discrimination-says-the-eeoc/. 
83  See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
84  See, e.g., Gilbert v. Country Music  Ass’n,   432  F.  App’x  516,  520   (6th  Cir.   2011)  
(distinguishing between sexual orientation claims and gender non-conforming claims, and 
suggesting that only the latter are actionable). 
85  852 P. 2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s   Equal Protection Clause, 86  as did Professor 
Eskridge in his path-breaking book on same sex marriage.87  
Moving from the equal protection version of this argument to the Title 
VII extension of it, however, involves a leap. The Equal Protection Clause 
of the 14th Amendment makes no mention of discrimination, based on race, 
sex, or otherwise. The Supreme Court has construed the Clause to 
presumptively forbid sex classifications,88 because they are analogous in 
important ways to racial classifications.89 Classifying based on LGBT status 
is a persuasive extension of that presumptive prohibition. Like traditional 
classifications distinguishing between males and females, classifications 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity suffer from similar qualities 
of prejudice, negative stereotyping, and caste re-affirmation,90 and bear little 
or no relationship to legitimate governmental purposes. Despite these 
arguments, the Court in Obergefell continued its longstanding pattern of not 
addressing whether classifications based on sexual orientation should be 
treated as presumptively suspect under the Equal Protection Clause.91 
Even if the Court had ruled such classifications suspect in Obergefell, 
however, the Title VII question of whether classifications based on sexual 
orientation are forbidden by the existing prohibition on sex discrimination 
would have remained open. Title VII does not track an abstract concept of 
“equal   protection.” Rather, it forbids discrimination in employment based 
on specific, identified characteristics, including sex. If one believes in 
dynamic statutory interpretation,92 extending the concept of discrimination 
based on sex to discrimination based on gender identity and sexual 
orientation makes perfect sense. All are related to social constructions of                                                         
86  Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).  
87  ESKRIDGE, supra note 20. 
88  See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976). 
89  Justice  Brennan’s  plurality  opinion  in  Frontiero  v.  Richardson,  411  U.S.  677  (1973)  
is the strongest attempt in a Supreme Court opinion to fully assimilate sex classifications 
with race classifications as constitutionally suspect. 
90  See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293; see generally William N. Eskridge, Original 
Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2568675; Akhil Amar, Attainder and 
Amendment  2:  Romer’s  Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996); Daniel Farber & Suzanna 
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996). 
91  The discussion of equal protection in the Obergefell opinion is cursory and reveals 
no effort to link up with the elaborate body of law about suspicious classifications. 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623-26. 
92  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
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sex and gender. All these types of discrimination involve reinforcing narrow 
and frequently demeaning stereotypes of male and female roles, attempting 
to impose gender-based identities on those for whom they are unsuitable, 
and producing irrational limitation of employment opportunities.  
If, in contrast, one asks the static interpretive question whether the 
enacting Congress in 1964 contemplated that its ban on sex discrimination 
would protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity, I suspect the answer might be quite different. Homophobia and 
animus toward LGBT people were pervasive in the U.S. at the time. 
Moreover, forbidding what we now view as conventional sex discrimination 
–- employment opportunities determined heavily by whether the applicant is 
male or female – was quite radical at that time. 93  The idea that the 
prohibition on sex discrimination implicitly included discrimination based 
on sexual orientation or gender identity would have deeply surprised the 
provision’s   proponents, and might well have doomed the provision to 
defeat.94 
If   the   EEOC’s   current   position   on LGBT discrimination eventually 
finds favor in the federal appellate courts, RFRA objections to application 
of the provision will not be far behind. Companies whose owners object on 
religious grounds to same sex marriage are certain to argue that their 
religious exercise is burdened by any statutory requirement that they 
recognize such a marriage as valid for purposes of employee benefits.  
As demonstrated by the discussion in Part I of RFRA objections to 
FMLA leave to care for same sex spouses, these RFRA objections should 
not prevail. The   government’s   interests in preventing invidious 
discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation or gender identity 
                                                        
93  It has been suggested that the prohibition on sex discrimination originally appeared 
in Title VII as a poison pill, designed to attract votes against the Bill. See Cary Franklin, 
Inventing the Traditional Concept of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1318 n. 
36 (2012) (citing prominent sources). Professor Franklin disputes this account. See id. at 
1317-1329.  
94  The leading academic proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which 
would have amended the Constitution to forbid governmental classifications based on sex, 
wrote a lengthy and now iconic piece about the scope and meaning of the proposed 
amendment without ever mentioning discrimination based on sexual orientation. Barbara 
Brown, et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for 
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 872 (1971). ERA advocates publicly disclaimed any connection 
between the proposed amendment and same sex marriage or intimacy. Douglas NeJaime, 
Before Marriage: The Unexplained History of Nonmarital Recognition and its Relationship 
to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 98-99 & n. 48-49 (2014).  
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are very strong, 95  and the government has available no alternative less 
restrictive of religious liberty for protecting these interests. The 
government’s   argument   is   still more powerful if this conflict between 
RFRA and Title VII arises from an interpretation that a ban on 
discrimination against those with same sex spouses is included in Title 
VII’s  prohibition on sex discrimination. In such circumstances, sustaining a 
RFRA objection would open the doors to successful RFRA objections in 
cases of more traditional sex discrimination in employment.96  
Moreover, if courts do interpret Title VII as currently framed to include 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, the question will remain 
whether the right of religious organizations to prefer co-religionists in 
hiring will permit the exclusion of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual 
employees, on the grounds that the organization has religious objection to 
same sex intimacy. The following section of this paper discusses the 
considerations of law and policy that will eventually come to bear on that 
question.  
 
B. Proposed Federal Legislation 
 
For a variety of reasons, advocates for LGBT rights are not depending 
exclusively upon the EEOC and the federal courts to interpret Title VII and 
other existing anti-discrimination statutes in ways favorable to the LGBT 
cause. These advocates have their legitimate doubts as to whether such a 
strategy will ultimately succeed. They know that Acts of Congress 
explicitly prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender                                                         
95  For recent documentation of the current scope of the problem, see Christy Mallory 
& Brad Sears, Evidence of Employment Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation or 
Gender Identity: An Analysis of Complaints Filed with State Enforcement Agencies, THE 
WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (Oct. 2015), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/workplace/ 
evidence-of-employment-discrimination-based-on-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-
an-analysis-of-complaints-filed-with-state-enforcement-agencies. See also Jenny Pizer, et 
al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination against LGBT People: 
The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal 
Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 720-42 (2012) (finding that existing legal 
protections against LGBT discrimination, including state and local antidiscrimination laws, 
are inadequate and incomplete); William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An 
Empirical Assessment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 76-101 (2001) (responding, based on 
empirical data, to common objections to ENDA). 
96  See, e.g., EEOC v. Fremont Christian Schools, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that religious entity commits unlawful sex discrimination when, for religious 
reasons,  it  offers  health  insurance  only  to  “heads  of  household,”  defined  as  single  parents  
and married males). 
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identity will make a more enduring and democratically legitimate statement 
than a friendly administrative or judicial construction of a fifty year-old 
statute. Moreover, judges will perceive the government interest in 
preventing such discrimination as stronger – in RFRA terms, compelling – 
if the enactment is recent, purposeful, well explained, and explicit on what 
forms of discrimination are forbidden.  
Accordingly, advocates of change through new federal legislation are 
proceeding vigorously. This path has not been very successful for the past 
decade. Even as rights to same sex marriage have expanded in state 
legislation as well as the state and federal judiciary, Congress has done little 
to explicitly forbid LGBT discrimination.97  
Obergefell will enrich and complicate that legislative conversation. 
Marriage equality is likely to be a strong driver of other claims of legal 
equality, 98 and simultaneously a motivating source of intense opposition to 
additional anti-discrimination norms among those who have now lost that 
fight. In other words, such a ruling from the Supreme Court may increase 
polarization around issues of LGBT rights. Now that marriage equality has 
prevailed, the victors will try to ride the front-lash produced by the 
normative power of what will have become actual – how can we as a nation 
deny rights of equal treatment in housing, credit, employment, and public 
accommodation to those whose equal citizenship has just been proclaimed 
in the sacred precincts of marriage?99 And the vanquished may redouble 
their efforts to block the perception that inferior treatment based on sexual                                                         
97  The Violence Against Women Act, supra note 46, is the only federal statute 
containing such a prohibition. In contrast, as of this writing, 22 states and the District of 
Columbia have jurisdiction-wide laws prohibiting LGBT discrimination in various fields, 
including employment and housing. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex 
Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1190 n.66-67 (2012) (identifying 21 such states). 
The only state to expand its anti-discrimination laws recently is Utah in March, 2015. The 
paper discusses the Utah legislation in Part III.C., infra.  
98  The historical contrast with the evolution of the law of racial discrimination is worth 
noting. In that context, statutory protections against discrimination in employment, public 
accommodations, and voting all preceded the recognition in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967), of a constitutional right to be free from race-based restrictions on marriage. Thus, 
resolution of conflict over the most intimate of interpersonal relations occurred relatively 
late in the struggle for racial equality. Perhaps the logic of LGBT rights, focused as they 
often are on patterns of intimacy, explains why ending marriage discrimination is a logical 
or foreseeable precursor to other progress in LGBT rights.   
99  See Jonathan Capehart, Legally Married Today, Legally Fired Tomorrow, 
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
partisan/wp/2015/02/11/legally-married-today-legally-fired-tomorrow/. 
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orientation or gender identity is invidious, akin to discrimination based on 
race or color.100 That perception turns what were once widespread social 
and religious norms into a form of bigotry, to be quickly and vehemently 
repudiated. 
Many opponents of LGBT rights legislation are likely to operate on 
two fronts, just as they have in their opposition to marriage equality. The 
primary front is straightforward opposition to the change in the legal status 
quo, coupled with roll-backs where achievable.101 The back-up strategy, 
which has been highly visible in the legislative wars over marriage, will be 
a demand for explicit exemptions from any anti-discrimination legislation 
that addresses sexual orientation and gender identity.102 
For the back-up strategy to have any chance of success, its supporters 
must make the case that religious opposition to LGBT equality deserves 
social and moral respect. Moreover, in a campaign for exemptions, specific 
exemptions are far superior to broad-based, generic religious exemptions 
like RFRA.103 A RFRA exemption claim is subject to interest-balancing, 
and RFRA is so vague that controversial interpretations of it do not confer 
full democratic legitimacy. 104  RFRAs are a Rorschach test, on which                                                         
100  See, e.g., Gerard Bradley, John Finnis, and Daniel Philpott, The Implications of 
Extending Marriage Benefits to Same Sex Couples, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE (Feb. 22, 
2015), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/02/14522/ (arguing that the University of 
Notre   Dame’s   extension of employment benefits to same sex spouses of employees is 
scandalous, supportive of sexual sin, and morally indefensible). 
101  Rollbacks have occurred at the state level. Kansas: Governor Rescinds Order 
Protecting Gay State Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/02/11/us/kansas-governor-rescinds-order-protecting-gay-state-workers.html. 
Similarly, recent Arkansas legislation preempts local gay rights laws. Aransas Bars 
Expanding Local Protections for Gays, Lesbians, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015, 7:08 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/02/23/us/ap-us-xgr-anti-discrimination-laws.html. 
102  See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text (discussing the newly proposed First 
Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Congress (1st Sess. 2015)). See also Thomas 
Berg, Archive: Memos/Letters on Religious Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage, MIRROR OF 
JUSTICE (Aug. 2, 2009), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/ 
memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html (discussing letters to state 
legislatures supporting exemptions related to marriage equality). For broader discussion of 
this two front strategy, see Siegel & NeJaime, supra note 60, at 2558-65. 
103  For elaboration of this proposition from an ardent defender of such exemptions, see 
Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change: What 
Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach About Specific Exemptions, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 703 (2014). 
104  Professor Marshall has a different view of the democratic legitimacy point. William 
P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 
123-24 (2014) (arguing that Hobby Lobby provides political recognition and legitimacy to  
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everyone can project their hopes and fears, and cannot be proven wrong 
until the courts resolve particular questions. Even when courts do so, the 
resolutions are highly fact-specific, so RFRA-based judicial precedents are 
rarely generalizable.105  
In contrast, specific exemptions, such as the exemption from Title VII 
for co-religionist hiring by religious entities,106 are typically not subject to 
interest-balancing. More significantly, they clearly identify their 
beneficiaries and specify the norms against which the exemptions may be 
invoked. So, for example, if non-profit religious entities were to be fully 
exempted from a federal law prohibiting LGBT discrimination in 
employment, the exemption would be clear and absolute.  
In yet another way, this distinction between generic and specific 
exemptions is likely to play a crucial role in the political fights to come. 
Prior to the decision in Hobby Lobby, in the specific and charged context of 
anti-discrimination law, the co-religionist provision in Title VII represented 
a legislative baseline about the entitlement to religion-based exemption. 
That statutory exemption protects only entities with primary religious 
purposes, and hence presumptively excludes for-profit firms.107 Moreover, 
that exemption does not extend to exclusions based on race, sex, national 
origin, or any forbidden ground of discrimination other than religion.108                                                                                                                                             
the  firm’s  religious  objections  to  contraception).  Professor  Marshall  builds  on  a  comparable  
argument from Professor Fishkin. Joseph Fishkin, Hobby Lobby and the Politics of 
Recognition, BALKANIZATION (June 30, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/06/hobby-
lobby-and-politics-of-recognition.html. 
105  I advance this thesis in detail in Lupu, supra note 11. 
106  Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-1 (2012). The federal Religious 
Land   Use   and   Institutionalized   Persons   Act   (“RLUIPA”)   is   a   hybrid,   because   it   relies  
heavily on vague, RFRA-like standards but is limited to the specific contexts of land use 
and persons coercively confined by the state. By my terminology, RLUIPA is not a 
“specific  exemption”  scheme. 
107  See generally Letter from Reed L. Russell, Legal Counsel at the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, to Kevin Cummings, Branch Chief of Business and Trade 
Services,  Dep’t  of  Homeland  Sec.,  on  Title  VIII  Religious  Organization  Exceptions  (Dec.  
28, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2007/religious_organization_ 
exception_dec_28_2007.html. 
108  See Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, U.S. Assistant Attorney General to 
Randolph D. Moss, Deputy Counsel to the President, at 30–32 (Oct. 12, 2000), available at 
http://perma.cc/PAL9-3NE4. For further discussion of the importance of this proposition 
for the future of employment discrimination law in the context of LGBT rights, see infra 
notes 132-147. The baseline may be different state-to-state. For example, in Utah, 
religiously   affiliated   organizations   are   entirely   exempt   from   the   state’s   fair   employment  
law with respect to all categories of discrimination. This made it politically easier to 
exempt these organizations from a new prohibition on LGBT discrimination in  
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In distinct and opposing ways, Hobby Lobby may profoundly influence 
the political battles over demands for specific exemptions. Those who seek 
to limit LGBT rights will assert that Hobby Lobby has its own normalizing 
effect – in particular, that it broadly legitimizes the concept of religious 
privilege. RFRA itself purports to do precisely that, by elevating religious 
objections to laws over comparable secular objections. The application of 
RFRA in a commercial setting, where religious privilege had been highly 
unusual, to say the least, extends the concept to new and unexpected 
spheres of life.109 Once that expansion of religious privilege has become 
enshrined in the law, the case to embody it specifically in particular statutes 
becomes far less radical. Accordingly, citing this account of Hobby Lobby, 
exemption promoters may seek specific exemptions for all religious 
objectors – individuals, non-profit organizations, and business firms — to 
legal norms of LGBT equality. RFRA already secures religious privilege, 
they will argue, so why not clarify the boundaries of the exemption rather 
than leave the matter to the uncertainties of litigation? 
An early example of the emergence of this strategy can be found in the 
proposed   “First  Amendment  Defense  Act.”110 The Act is quite specific in                                                                                                                                             
employment. See infra text at note 216. For commentary on why the Utah model is not the 
appropriate national model with respect to discrimination based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity, see Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, and Micah Schwartzman, Utah 
“Compromise”  to  Protect  LGBT  Citizens  from  Discrimination  is  No  Model  for  the  Nation, 
SLATE (Mar. 18 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/18/gay_rights_ 
the_utah_compromise_is_no_model_for_the_nation.html. 
109  Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Anomalous & Unjust: Responding to Indiana 
RFRA and Beyond, CORNERSTONE (Apr. 27, 2015), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ 
cornerstone/rfra-in-indiana-and-beyond/responses/anomalous-and-unjust. Two of my 
fellow Symposium participants have sparred over whether Hobby Lobby represents a new 
front in religious privilege. Professor Horwitz has argued that the public controversy over 
Hobby Lobby represents a breakdown in what had been a consensus about accommodation 
of religion. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014). 
Professor Sepper has replied that the consensus, whatever its contours, never extended to 
commercial, for-profit actors, especially in contexts where their employees bore the brunt 
of the accommodation. Elizabeth Sepper, Reports  of  Accommodation’s  Death  Have  Been  
Greatly Exaggerated, HARV. L. REV. FORUM (Nov. 10, 2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/ 
2014/11/reports-of-accommodations-death-have-been-greatly-exaggerated. See also James 
M. Oleske, Jr., The Born-Again Champion of Conscience, HARV. L. REV. FORUM (Jan. 22, 
2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/01/the-born-again-champion-of-conscience (book 
review) (arguing that many liberals and liberal organizations  “support  religious  exemptions  
for individuals, while opposing the extension of such exemptions to commercial 
businesses.”). 
110  H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/2802. As of this writing, the future of the First Amendment Defense  
2015] Moving Targets 33 
 
 
what religious convictions it is designed to protect. It would forbid the 
federal government from taking  
 
any discriminatory action against a person, wholly or 
partially on the basis that such person believes or acts in 
accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction that 
marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man 
and one woman, or that sexual relations are properly 
reserved to such a marriage.111 
 
Although   the   reference   to   “discriminatory   action”   is   vague,   the   Act  
then   specifies   several   examples   of   such   action,   including   revoking   “an  
exemption from taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code,”112 and  denying  “any  Federal  grant,  contract  .  .  .  license,  certification,  
accreditation, employment, or other similar position or status from or to 
such   person.”113 The specificity of what religiously motivated actions are 
insulated from federal sanction and which punitive measures by government 
are barred is in quite sharp contrast to the sweeping and vague generalities 
of a scheme like RFRA or its state counterparts. 
Moreover, building explicitly on Hobby Lobby, the First Amendment 
Defense Act defines person by reference to the U.S. Code definition,114 
which includes corporate persons, and the Act specifically includes “any  .  .  .  
person regardless of religious affiliation or lack thereof, and regardless of 
for-profit  or  nonprofit  status.”115 Whether such a proposal, if enacted, would                                                                                                                                             
Act was quite uncertain. See Ed Morrisey, Will the First Amendment Defense Act Fall 
Victim to Beltway elbow-throwing?, HOTAIR (July 13, 2015 10:01 AM), 
http://hotair.com/archives/2015/07/13/will-the-first-amendment-defense-act-fall-victim-to-
beltway-elbow-throwing/; Colby Itkowitz, House GOP Moderates Ready Intraparty Battle 
over Religious Freedom Bill, WASHINGTON POST (July 17, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/07/17/house-gop-moderates-
ready-intraparty-battle-over-religious-freedom-bill/.  
111  H.R. 2802, supra note 110, at § 3(a). 
112  Id. at § 3(b)(1). 
113  Id. at § 3(b)(3). A recent survey has found that the IRS has not revoked the tax 
exemption of a religious entity on the grounds that its teachings are contrary to public 
policy since 1978, when racially discriminatory policies of various schools led to the 
decision in Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574. See Sam Brunson, The Church Will Not Lose 
its Tax Exempt Status, BY COMMON CONSENT (July 9, 2015), 
http://bycommonconsent.com/2015/07/09/the-church-will-not-lose-its-tax-exempt-status/. 
114  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2755. H.R. 2802, supra note 110, at § 6.2(c) 
(referencing  “section  1  of  title  1,  United  States  Code”). 
115  Id. 
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provide a better defense than RFRA for a business that refused to treat a 
same-sex marriage as valid for purposes of compliance with federal law is 
somewhat uncertain, because of the undefined quality of the catch-all 
prohibition   on   “discriminatory   action.” Enforcing general statutes like the 
Family  and  Medical  Leave  Act  is  hardly  “discriminatory.”  Nevertheless, the 
First Amendment Defense Act is a good example of the specific exemption 
strategy that I expect will take hold at both the federal and state level. 
In the context of anti-discrimination law and otherwise, those who seek 
to expand LGBT rights in federal law are likely to fight fiercely against any 
such accommodations. They may oppose even the narrowest of exemptions 
for religious entities, including houses of worship. First, LGBT rights 
groups will persistently contest the idea that religious opposition to the 
intimate lives of LGBT people is culturally or morally respectable. Over 
time, that idea is likely to become marginalized in ways akin to what 
eventually transpired with respect to public support for slavery or racial 
segregation.116  
Second, these groups will object to the notion that Hobby Lobby 
normalized any broad baseline of religious privilege. From their 
perspective, explicit religious exemptions should not extend to for-profit 
business firms. Nor should accommodations for non-profit religious entities 
go any further than the pre-existing co-religionist preference in Title VII, 
which cannot be implemented in ways that discriminate against protected 
classes.117  
Third, and most significantly, LGBT rights groups will insist that 
Hobby Lobby must be read to permit only those exemptions that do not 
inflict harm on third parties. The  decision,  as  Justice  Kennedy’s  concurring  
opinion predicted, has now produced an accommodation designed to ensure 
that employees of objecting for-profit firms eventually receive the disputed 
coverage through a third party. 118  Accordingly, Hobby Lobby remains                                                         
116  For a careful exploration of why religious objections to same sex marriage have 
been afforded so much more respect than were comparable objections to inter-racial 
intimacy, see Oleske, Jr., supra note 59.  
117  See infra notes 140-142 and accompanying text. 
118  134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Obama Administration has created 
such an accommodation, see Coverage of Preventive Services under the Affordable Care 
Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41318 et seq., (July 14, 2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/FR-2015-07-14/pdf/2015-17076.pdf. The new policy builds upon the accommodation 
that has been in place for religious non-profits. The non-profit accommodation remains 
mired in RFRA-based litigation. See supra note 65. The new for-profit accommodation 
may yet be challenged in court, and in any event will not lead to contraceptive coverage 
until the beginning of the next insurance plan coverage year. 80 Fed. Reg. at 41322. 
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constrained by a concern that third parties suffer no material harm.119 If it so 
bounded, exemptions from anti-discrimination laws must be strictly limited. 
The proposed First Amendment Defense Act would violate that limit if it 
permits private parties to refuse to recognize the validity of a same-sex 
marriage, in contexts where that denial would deprive parties to such a 
marriage of valuable rights or benefits.  
Fourth, in light of Hobby Lobby, LGBT rights proponents will be 
rightly concerned that any specific exemption or accommodation for some 
religious interests will put a significant burden on the government to explain 
why the accommodation should not be extended to other religious 
claimants, business firms or others. 120  For supporters of LGBT rights, 
Hobby Lobby has made the bargaining chip, represented by specific 
exemptions, far more dangerous or expensive to play.  
The existing federal baseline for exceptional treatment of religious 
organizations, and the accompanying concern for third party harms, 
profoundly influenced the debate over President   Obama’s   decision   to  
amend long-standing Executive Order 11246 to include sexual orientation 
and gender identity as prohibited grounds of discrimination in employment 
by persons or firms contracting with the federal government.121 Prior to the                                                         
119  Loewentheil, supra note 5. This proposition of course remains in doubt, and 
Professor Nelson Tebbe has testified before a House subcommittee that RFRA should be 
amended to make that limitation explicit. Hearing on Oversight of RFRA and RLUIPA 
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 114th 
Cong. 6-7 (2015) (statement of Professor Nelson Tebbe), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/497441bc-b2fa-4b10-8ade-91f6603588fe/tebbe-
02132015.pdf. A significant part of the intellectual and jurisprudential push for this 
proposal comes from the argument that the Establishment Clause requires that RFRA be 
limited in this way. See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. 703. For the fullest defense of this 
line of argument in the context of the Hobby Lobby litigation, see Frederick Gedicks & 
Rebecca Van Tassel, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An 
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014). 
120  Soon  after   the  Supreme  Court’s  Hobby Lobby decision, a major part of the LGBT 
rights coalition withdrew its support for any broad exemption, from the then-proposed 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. § 815 (2013), for religious 
non-profit entities. See Chris Geidner, Three Reasons LGBT Groups are Fighting Over a 
Bill  That  Isn’t  Going  to  Become  Law, BUZZFEED (July 9, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
chrisgeidner/three-reasons-lgbt-groups-are-fighting-over-a-bill-that-isnt. One reason the 
withdrawing groups cited was the possibility that Hobby Lobby would encourage RFRA 
objections to ENDA by for-profit firms, and that those objections might be strengthened if 
ENDA exempted religious non-profits. Id. The exemption proposed in H.R. 1755 was very 
broad, effectively removing religious entities entirely from coverage, without regard to 
whether they had religious objections to same sex intimacy. See id. 
121  Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014). 
36 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 7   
 
issuance  of  President  Obama’s  Order, opposing interests conducted a fierce 
public debate on whether it should include a broad and categorical 
exemption for religious non-profits. A group of faith leaders called on the 
President to include such an exemption in the Executive Order.122 Other 
faith leaders and a group of legal scholars, myself included, urged the 
President to issue the Order without a categorical exemption for religious 
entities.123  
As issued, the Order did not include the requested exemption. Instead, 
it left intact Section 204 (c) of the Order, which is in perfect alignment with 
the Title VII co-religionist exemption;124 that is, the Order preserved the 
pre-existing statutory baseline for exemption from anti-discrimination law. 
The analysis in this paper suggests strongly that the President acted 
prudently in resisting the demands from some faith leaders that non-profit 
religious entities be broadly excluded from the new provision in the 
Executive Order. Had President Obama yielded to these entreaties, for-
profit firms that wished to rely on RFRA to likewise discriminate would 
have jumped on any such exclusion. These firms would have argued that the 
exclusion showed that a) the President had affirmed a new baseline of broad 
accommodation of religious objection to LGBT rights measures; b) in 
RFRA terms, the government interest was less than compelling because a 
broad   exemption   had   left   “appreciable   damage   to   that supposedly vital 
interest un-prohibited;;”   and   c) as in Hobby Lobby, the accommodation 
could readily be extended to for-profit firms with religious objections to 
compliance with the new Order. That the Order, as issued, retains only the 
pre-existing right of religious entities to prefer co-religionists—a right that                                                         
122  Michelle Boorstein, Faith Leaders: Exempt Religious Groups from Order Barring 
LGBT Bias in Hiring, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 2, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/faith-leaders-exempt-religious-groups-from-order-
barring-lgbt-bias-in-hiring/2014/07/02/d82e68da-01f1-11e4-b8ff-89afd3fad6bd_story.html. 
123  See Letter from Faith Group Leaders to President Barack Obama (July 8, 2014) 
(urging no exclusion of religious entities from the proposed order), available at 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/8wzzpbviygds1pv/Faith%20Letter%20to%20President%20De
fending%20Exec%20Order%202014-07-08%20FINAL.pdf; Letter from Legal Scholars to 
President Barack Obama (July 14, 2014) (urging no exclusion of religious entities), 
available at https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality 
/executive_order_letter_final_0.pdf.  
124  Section  204(c)  provides  that  the  Order  “shall not apply to a Government contractor 
or subcontractor that is a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society, with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform 
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational 
institution,  or  society  of  its  activities.” Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 
24, 1965), available at http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/statutes/eo11246.htm.  
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no court has ever extended under Title VII or RFRA to a for-profit 
business125— renders the Order much less vulnerable to a Hobby Lobby 
style attack from a for-profit religious objector. 
This episode, which went through its final stages in the immediate 
aftermath of Hobby Lobby, should be instructive for legislative fights going 
forward. LGBT rights groups have recently advanced a sweeping proposal, 
under   the   umbrella   title   “The   Equality   Act,”   to   expand   federal anti-
discrimination laws to cover sexual orientation and gender identity, in the 
contexts of (among others) credit, education, employment, housing, and 
public accommodations. 126  For all the reasons suggested above, this 
package includes no categorical exemptions for religious entities. 
Moreover, the proposal includes a specific exclusion of RFRA claims from 
all relevant federal antidiscrimination laws.127 
That proposed exclusion of RFRA claims will raise the stakes 
considerably in legislative debate over specific exemptions from LGBT 
anti-discrimination law. If religiously motivated interests do not get specific 
statutory protection in any new anti-discrimination laws, they will have no 
escape whatsoever from compliance. They will thus fight the laws 
intensely, and they will fight just as intensely for exemptions from any laws 
that might pass. Groups advocating for LGBT rights will fight for the laws 
and against the exemptions with equal fervor.  
In the past, the leading example of this kind of struggle involved the 
never-enacted federal Employment Non-Discrimination   Act   (“ENDA”), 
which would have prohibited employment discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Over a number of years and Congresses, the                                                         
125  See EEOC v. Townley Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 617–19 (9th Cir. 1988) (for-profit 
corporation cannot qualify for Title VII exemption of religious corporations from the ban 
on preferring co-religionists). For broader discussion of which employers are covered by 
the co-religionist exemption, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Religious Exemptions 
and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY (Zoe Robinson, Chad Flanders, Micah Schwartzman, eds., forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535991. 
126  See references to the proposed Equality Act, supra note 13. See generally, Human 
Rights Campaign, Beyond Marriage Equality: A Blueprint for Federal Non-Discrimination 
Protections, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-
1.amazonaws.com//files/documents/HRC-BeyondMarriageEquality-42015.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2015). 
127  See H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. § 1107 (2015) (excluding RFRA claims and defenses 
under all the titles of federal law covered by the Act). The exclusion would not be limited 
to sexual orientation and gender identity claims; it would extend to all categories of 
forbidden discrimination (race, sex, national origin, etc.) under the covered titles of 
antidiscrimination law. Id. 
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leading ENDA proposals included a complete exemption for all employers 
that qualify for the existing co-religionist exemption. 128  That is, if an 
employer was free under Title VII to limit hiring to co-religionists,129 it 
would not be subject to  ENDA,  without  regard  to  the  employer’s  religious 
precepts on same-sex intimacy. In the summer of 2014, after the Supreme 
Court announced the Hobby Lobby decision, a number of groups supporting 
ENDA withdrew their support on the ground that the proposed religious 
organizational exemption was too broad.130 
Consider the competing policy positions on the extent to which 
religious organizations should be exempt from the proposed Equality Act, 
or any comparable enactment. The most employer-friendly version is a 
complete exemption. The alternative is the creation of no special exemption 
from a prohibition on discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity; instead, religious organizations would retain their statutory right to 
prefer co-religionists.131 The difference between these positions is wide and 
significant. A complete exemption represents an unprecedented expansion 
of the baseline of religious privilege; with respect to non-ministerial 
positions,132 employers that qualify for the co-religionist exemption have 
always been subject to all other prohibitions on discrimination, including 
race, sex, age, disability, and national origin. A complete exemption would 
                                                        
128  See H.R.  1755,  113th  Cong.§  6  (2013)  (“[T]his Act shall not apply to a corporation, 
association, educational institution or institution of learning, or society that is exempt from 
the religious discrimination provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant 
…  to section 702(a) or 703(e)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e–1(a), 2000e–2(e)(2)).” 
129  The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012). (“This  subchapter shall 
not  apply  …  to  a  religious  corporation,  association,  educational  institution,  or  society  with  
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected 
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of 
its  activities.”).  
130  See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  
131  The  text  of  the  proposed  Equality  Act  “would  continue  to  allow 
religious corporations, associations, educational institutions, and societies to hire only 
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with their religious 
activities.”   SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY ET AL., SECTION BY SECTION SUMMARY OF THE 
EQUALITY ACT 2 (2015), available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
EqualityAct_SectionBySection.pdf (summarizing  “Section  7.  Employment.”) 
132  The constitutionally based ministerial exception effectively removes ministerial 
positions from all anti-discrimination laws. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). See also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 
35, at 43-45, 54-61 (explaining and justifying the ministerial exception on Establishment 
Clause grounds).  
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thus constitute a significant departure from the existing baseline, 
represented by the co-religionist exemption, for hiring by religious entities. 
Is there any justification for a complete exemption for religious 
organizations from a prohibition on LGBT discrimination, rather than a 
continuation of the legal status quo, in which religious organizations retain 
their co-religionist hiring privilege but nothing more? In an article 
admirable for its tone and balance, 133  Professor Alan Brownstein has 
developed arguments that lead him in the direction of the complete 
exemption. Professor Brownstein asserts that religious identity and sexual 
orientation are comparable, in many respects, as defining elements of a 
person’s  life.134 From this premise, he reasons that the extent of the right to 
be selective – that is, to discriminate – with respect to religion should 
frequently line up with the right to be selective with respect to sexual 
orientation. This leads him to tentatively conclude, in this article and in 
recent testimony to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, that  “when  Title  VII  
is amended to protect members of the LGBT community against 
employment discrimination, an additional exemption for religious 
organizations permitting them to discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation or identity, similar in scope to the [702] exemption, may be 
justified.”135 
Professor   Brownstein’s   view is premised on a misreading of the 
relevant law, and would produce poor policy results. The misreading is his 
assumption that the existing co-religionist exemption extends to exclusion 
of those whose religious identity is undesirable to the employer. On that 
view, an employer covered by the exemption could have a policy of hiring 
anyone except a Jew, or a Mormon, or an atheist. Were that correct, 
extension of the policy would permit exclusion of LGBT people. But this 
understanding of the exemption – as a right to exclude the religiously 
undesirable -- does not comport with the language, purpose, or judicial 
interpretation of the exemption.                                                          
133  Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for 
Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same Sex Couples to 
Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389 (2010). 
134  Id. at 400-409. 
135  Alan Brownstein, Examining Workplace Discrimination Against Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Transgender Americans, U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS 6 (Mar. 16, 2015) 
(copy on file with author and with ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV). See also supra note 133, at 
424-25   (explaining   that   under  Brownstein’s  model,   “Title  VII’s   exemption   of   non-profit 
religious   organizations   from   the   statute’s   prohibition   against   religious   discrimination   in  
hiring would  extend  to  the  hiring  of  married  gays  and  lesbians.”). 
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The exemption reads: “This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a 
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform 
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society of its activities.” 136  As judicially 
explained, the exemption is designed to permit religious entities to carry out 
their mission by preferring members of their own faith. Concurring in Amos 
v. Corporation of Presiding Bishops,137 the decision in which the Court 
upheld the exemption against Establishment Clause attack, Justice Brennan 
wrote, “We are willing to countenance the imposition of [religious criteria 
for employment] because we deem it vital that, if certain activities 
constitute part of a religious community's practice, then a religious 
organization should be able to require that only members of its community 
perform  those  activities.”138  
The co-religionist exemption thus permits religious entities to prefer 
members of their own religious community for the purposes of carrying out 
the   organization’s   mission. It does not, however, extend to excluding 
members of faiths that the employer views as undesirable. Professor 
Brownstein’s  suggestion  that  LGBT  antidiscrimination  proposals include a 
complete exemption for religious organizations, on the ground that it maps 
onto their existing authority to prefer co-religionists, is flawed. 
Once the analogy fails, it remains to be determined as a matter of 
policy whether religious organizations should have a complete exemption 
from   the  Equality  Act’s   employment  provisions or still be limited to their 
co-religionist exemption. The complete exemption, for reasons just 
discussed, is anomalous. It would permit religious organizations to refuse to 
hire, or to dismiss, a person based on sexual orientation or gender identity, 
whether or not the person had acted in ways that violated the organization’s  
religious principles. It is thus entirely overbroad in relation to religious 
need. Moreover, if religious organizations had the benefit of a complete 
exemption,  the  result  would  frequently  be  an  iteration  of  “Don’t  Ask,  Don’t  
Tell.” An LGBT employee of a religious organization that would fire 
anyone who openly revealed that status would have to remain closeted.                                                         
136  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012).  
137  483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
138  Id. at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Boyd v. Harding Academy of 
Memphis, 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[Section 702] does not, however, exempt 
religious educational institutions with respect to all discrimination. It merely indicates that 
such institutions may choose to employ members of their own religion without fear of being 
charged with religious discrimination.") (emphasis added). 
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Needless  to  say,  a  same  sex  marriage  is  a  “tell,”  so  an  employee  in  such  a  
marriage would have to refrain from claiming spousal benefits available to 
others, or otherwise disclosing the sex of his spouse. 
Does the pre-existing co-religionist exemption satisfy the relevant 
interests? The right to prefer co-religionists is not limited to matters of 
religious identity or affiliation. By judicial interpretation, it extends to 
practices forbidden or required by religious faith.139 An Orthodox Jewish 
congregation, for example, could fire an Orthodox Jewish employee for 
failing to follow Jewish dietary laws, or for disrespecting the Sabbath. 
At first glance, the principle that the co-religionist exemption extends 
to practices in compliance with faith, as well as to identity and affiliation, 
suggests that the exemption would permit firing of an employee for being 
sexually active with a person of the same sex, if the religious employer held 
to principles condemning such practices. As noted above, however, the law 
constrains the co-religionist exemption with another, equally powerful 
principle – the relevant religious prohibition may not run afoul of other 
prohibited categories of discrimination. 140  The Orthodox Jewish 
congregation referred to above would not be free to fire females who broke 
the Sabbath, while giving a pass to males who behaved identically.  
Similarly, a religious corporation would be free to discriminate against 
LGBT persons only if it relied on a religious norm that was itself non-
discriminatory. As I have explained elsewhere,141 “such  an  employer  might  
exclude from employment any person who divorced and remarried, but the 
employer would have to enforce this norm against all employees, and could 
not use it as a pretext for discriminating against LGBT employees. More 
pointedly, any bright-line exclusion of same-sex spouses from family 
benefits, coupled with a practice of inclusion of all opposite-sex spouses, 
would  be   in  direct  violation”  of  a  prohibition  against  discrimination  based  
on sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Limiting religious entities to the existing baseline, represented by the 
co-religionist exemption, thus represents a salutary move in the direction of                                                         
139  See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F. 2d 944 (3rd Cir. 1991) (upholding dismissal of 
Catholic school teacher who entered a marriage not recognized by the Church). 
140  See Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, U.S. Assistant Attorney General to 
William P. Marshall, Deputy Counsel to the President 30–32 (Oct. 12, 2000), available at 
http://perma.cc/PAL9-3NE4. See also Lederman, supra note 81; Rose Saxe, The Truth 
About Religious Employers and Civil Rights Laws, CORNERSTONE BLOG (July 28, 2014), 
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-truth-about-religious-employers-and-
civil-rights-laws, archived at http:// perma.cc/9CZD-XJJZ.  
141  Lupu, supra note 11, at 96. 
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organizational accountability. The limitation would force these employers 
to justify, as a matter of religious principle, any adverse job action based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity. Identifying that principle would 
clarify any potential ground of exclusion, and block the use of inherently 
discriminatory grounds. If religious organizations must articulate grounds 
that are neutral with respect to sexual orientation, they can maintain and 
enforce much of their teaching on sexuality without favoring heterosexuals. 
For example, they can insist that their employees refrain from sex outside of 
marriage, but they would have to respect same sex marriage equally with 
different sex marriage. 
Concerned religious organizations will no doubt assert that limiting 
them to the co-religionist exemption, constrained in this way, will not 
permit them to fully realize their religious principles in the workplace. But 
that is always true of the operation of the exemption. For a leading example, 
religious communities that believe that women should be subordinate to 
men cannot manifest these principles in their hiring policies.142 Nothing in 
the context of sexual orientation or gender identity justifies a departure from 
that limitation.  
Significantly, religious organizations still retain the ministerial 
exception,143 which gives them full authority to restrict in any way hiring 
for positions as clergy or other positions responsible for teaching the faith. 
Religious entities also retain complete control over their religious teaching 
about human sexuality. 144  Moreover, religious organizations may adjust 
their employee benefit policies to include a wide array of domestic 
partners,145 including spouses, or to eliminate family benefits altogether.146                                                         
142  EEOC v. Fremont Christian Schools, 781 F. 2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a 
violation  of  Title  VII   in  Christian   school’s   religion-based policy that only single persons 
and  married  men  can  qualify   as   “head  of   household”   for   purposes  of   employer-provided 
health insurance). 
143  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 .  
144  For a comparable analysis in a somewhat different context, see Nan D. Hunter, 
Pluralism and its Perils: Navigating the Tension Between Gay Rights and Religious 
Expression, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 435 (2014). 
145  Catholic Charities in Maine and San Francisco,  CA  have  adopted  this  sort  of  “plus  
one”   policy,   permitting   employees   to   designate   any   adult   to   receive   employee   benefit  
coverage without regard to whether the designated adult is a spouse or intimate partner. 
Maine Charity to Provide Domestic Partner Benefits, UNMARRIED AMERICA (Nov. 14, 
2002), http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/members/news/2002/November-DP/ME_charity_ 
to_provide_dp_benefits_Nov_14,2002.html.  
146  After the District of Columbia enacted a law permitting same-sex marriage, Catholic 
Charities of DC eliminated spousal benefits for employees in order to avoid coverage of 
same-sex spouses. See Archdiocese of Washington Ends Spousal Benefits, Citing Gay  
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As this discussion reveals, compromise over the form of the Equality 
Act, and any religious exemption it may contain, will be very difficult. 
Traditional religious organizations will want a complete exemption; LGBT 
rights groups will fiercely resist that. Moreover, Hobby Lobby may have 
widened considerably the gap  between  each  side’s  approach   to   the issues. 
Hobby Lobby’s   false   promise   of   a   new,   generic   baseline   of   religious  
privilege, expanded to commercial actors acting in discriminatory ways, 
may reinforce conservative hold outs from any new legislation. And Hobby 
Lobby’s  threat  that specific accommodation of some objectors will produce 
an invitation to RFRA-based accommodation of all objectors will equally 
reinforce progressive resistance to even the narrowest religious exemption. 
Holding the line on the co-religionist exemption, in its present scope, has 
become by far the most sensible strategy for the LGBT rights campaign.147 
Whether that will be acceptable to religious organizations is an open 
question. 
As advocates of LGBT rights seek new protections in federal law, they 
will face many obstacles. Hobby Lobby is now among those obstacles, 
because of the legal and political legitimation it appears to provide to claims 
of religious exemption in a commercial context. Indeed, because the RFRA 
purports to restore constitutional norms that the Supreme Court had 
abandoned, Hobby Lobby appears to provide constitutional legitimation as                                                                                                                                             
Marriage Law, LGBTQ NATION (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/ 
2010/03/archdiocese-of-washington-ends-spousal-benefits-citing-gay-marriage-law.  
147  One other context of federal law deserves mention, because its baseline is different, 
and far less hospitable to claims of religious privilege. In the development of President 
George  W.  Bush’s Faith Based and Community Initiative, and its inclusion of faith-based 
organizations as potential federal grantees in the delivery of social services, the Executive 
Branch firmly and explicitly prohibited any religious discrimination among beneficiaries. 
Exec. Order No. 13279, 67 C.F.R. 241, § 2(d) (Dec. 16, 2002), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2002-12-16/pdf/02-31831.pdf. A faith-based grantee 
may not exclude or discriminate against any beneficiary based on faith commitments, 
membership in a religious community, willingness to engage in any form of worship, or 
any other ground that has its basis in religious norms. Id. § 2(f). In this context, therefore, 
the baseline is one of no religious privilege whatsoever. For an account of current 
controversies concerning the role of RFRA with respect to religious selectivity by grantees 
with respect to employees, and to the choice of services available to beneficiaries, see Chris 
Geidner, Progressive Groups Ask Obama to End Bush-Era Religious Protection, 
BUZZFEED (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/progressive-groups-
ask-obama-to-end-bush-era-religious-prote#.akrNXnME0; Sarah Posner, Discrimination 
on  the  Taxpayer’s  Dime?  The  Fight  to  Curtail  the  Overreach  of  RFRA,  USCANNENBERG: 
RELIGION DISPATCHES (Apr. 30, 2015), http://religiondispatches.org/discrimination-on-the-
taxpayers-dime-the-fight-to-curtail-the-overreach-of-rfra/. 
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well. In an ironic twist, however, Hobby Lobby may turn out to be a friend 
of the LGBT rights movement. The decision provides a principled reason to 
oppose statutory exceptions to new anti-discrimination laws for any and all 
religious objectors; if LGBT rights advocates give an inch, they may lose a 
RFRA-pushed mile. Indeed, Hobby Lobby gives LGBT rights advocates 
strong grounds to assert the necessity of a generic exclusion from 
antidiscrimination laws of RFRA claims and defenses. 148  Whether that 
stance wins the day, or precludes all possibility of compromise, remains to 
be seen.  
 
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND LGBT PROTECTIONS IN STATE LAW 
  
Recent events in Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, and elsewhere 
have brought to prominence the intense conflict under state and local law 
between the possibility of LGBT rights and claims of religious freedom. For 
many reasons, the state law story of the relationship between Hobby Lobby 
and LGBT rights is significantly different from the federal version. The 
Federal RFRA, and Hobby Lobby’s  interpretation  of  it, are applicable only 
to federal law. Those who complain of burdens on religious freedom from 
application of state anti-discrimination law must look to state constitutions, 
state RFRAs, or specific state statutory exemptions. Instead of a single, 
national jurisdiction, the state-centered narrative involves fifty different 
state jurisdictions, plus potential conflict between relevant state and local 
law.  
The sections that follow subdivide the subject of state law into three 
parts. Part A appraises the current legal situation, which has two key 
components. Part A first describes the wide geographical disconnect 
between religious liberty legislation and statewide LGBT protections in 
anti-discrimination law, and then addresses the handful of decisions 
involving vendors who have refused to serve same-sex weddings. Part B 
focuses on the likelihood of new state legislation and the ways in which 
Hobby Lobby may influence the relevant political discourse. Part C analyzes 
the possible impact of Hobby Lobby on future state court adjudication of the 




                                                         
148  The proposed Equality Act would do precisely that. See text at note 127, supra. 
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A. Current Circumstances – Legislation and Adjudication. 
 
1. The Legislative Mismatch 
 
The current distribution of state-wide laws on LGBT rights and 
religious liberty reveals a stark mismatch. This paper opened with an 
extreme example—Alabama has a RFRA in its state constitution, but has no 
statewide laws that forbid discrimination in employment or public 
accommodations. 149  More typically, many states with strong religious 
liberty protections do have prohibitions on some forms of employment 
discrimination, but do not include LGBT discrimination among the 
prohibited grounds.150 A number of blue states reveal the opposite pattern—
state-wide anti-discrimination laws that include sexual orientation and 
gender identity, and no RFRA to set against them.151 
More precisely, the mismatched numbers reveal the following: twenty-
two states (and D.C.) have jurisdiction-wide laws that forbid discrimination 
based on LGBT status in employment, housing, and/or public 
accommodations.152 Twenty-one states now have RFRAs modeled on the 
federal Act.153 The overlap between these two sets is four—Connecticut,                                                         
149  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Similarly, Mississippi added a RFRA to 
its laws in 2014. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-61-1 (2014). Like Alabama, Mississippi has no 
state wide regime of anti-discrimination laws with respect to employment or public 
accommodations. Id.  
150  See James Oleske, State Inaction, Equal Protection, and Religious Resistance to 
LGBT Rights, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2589743. Professor Oleske argues in this piece that states 
with anti-discrimination laws that do not include sexual orientation as a forbidden 
classification are acting in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at (SSRN version) 
27-42. 
151  Lupu, supra note 11, at 99 n.312.  
152  Id. (citing NeJaime, supra note 102, at 1190 n.66–67 (asserting that 21 states follow 
this model)). Of these twenty-one states, only Wisconsin, New York, and New Hampshire 
omit gender identity as a forbidden ground of discrimination. See Non-Discrimination 
Laws: State by State Information—Map, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015). Recent legislation on LGBT rights and religious liberty made Utah 
the twenty-second state on this list. See Brady McCombs & Kelly Catalfamo, Mormon 
Church Backs Utah LGBT Anti-Discrimination Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.chron.com/news/us/article/Mormon-church-backs-Utah-anti-discrimination-bill 
-6114748.php.  
153  See Marci Hamilton, Here is What is Happening in Your State, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RESTORATION ACT PERILS, http://rfraperils.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (confirming  
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Illinois, New Mexico, and Rhode Island are currently the only states that 
have RFRAs and state-wide anti-discrimination laws that include LGBT 
status.154 In addition, another eight states have the combination of broad 
anti-discrimination laws and state constitutional provisions that have been 
construed in ways akin to the pre-Smith, pre-RFRA regime of free exercise 
adjudication.155 Accordingly, under current law, only twelve states—four 
with RFRAs plus eight with constitutional norms—present the possibility of 
strong conflict between state-wide LGBT anti-discrimination laws and 
statewide religious freedom laws. 
Local law offers another dimension to the possible clashes. In a 
considerable number of states that have RFRAs, are considering RFRAs, or 
have strong constitutional protections for religious exercise, local 
jurisdictions have enacted LGBT anti-discrimination laws. These include 
(among many others) Phoenix, Arizona, where proposed amendments to the 
state’s religious freedom law produced a political uproar,156 nearly costing 
the state the 2015 Super Bowl; and Atlanta, Georgia, where a proposed state 
level RFRA generated considerable controversy, and eventually died as a 
result of concern that it would promote discrimination against members of 




                                                                                                                                             
21 states with RFRAs currently). As discussed below, Hobby Lobby may manifest 
persuasive (though not binding) effects on interpretation of similarly worded state RFRAs. 
154  Lupu, supra note 11, at 99, n.312. 
155  These states are Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. (providing NeJaime list of states with LGBT laws); see 
also Loewentheil, supra note 5. These state constitutional patterns, too, may ultimately be 
influenced, though they are not in any way bound, by Hobby Lobby’s  explication  of  federal  
religious freedom principles, both constitutional and statutory. 
156  Lupu, supra note 11, at 44, n.25. 
157  Kathleen Foody, Georgia Lawmakers Leave without Vote on Religious Freedom 
Bill, WASH. TIMES (Ap. 3, 2015), http://www.ajc.com/ap/ap/georgia/religious-freedom-
measure-focus-of-ga-lawmakers-la/nkkq2/. I was among the signatories of a Letter from 
Legal Scholars in opposition to the Georgia proposal. Letter from Ira C. Lupu et al., F. 
Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law Emeritus, George Washington University, to 
Nathan Deal et al., Governor of Georgia (Jan. 21, 2015), available at 
http://www.georgiaunites.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Georgia-Religious-Freedom-
Letter.pdf. For further detail about local LGBT-protecting laws, see State Resource Map, 
THE WILLIAMS INST., http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/#mapwrap (last visited Sept. 27, 
2015).  
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2. Recent and Current Litigation 
 
The mismatch between LGBT rights-oriented states and RFRA states 
explains in part the relative infrequency of the oft-discussed legal conflicts 
between wedding vendors who object to same sex marriage, and members 
of same-sex couples seeking goods and services for wedding celebrations. 
The frequency of such disputes is not zero, however, and the vendors thus 
far have never successfully defeated discrimination claims against them. 
Elane Photography v. Willock,158 decided in 2013, is the most well known 
of these cases. In Elane Photography, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
avoided   dealing   with   the   potential   conflict   between   the   state’s   Human  
Rights Act and its RFRA by ruling that RFRA applied only in government-
initiated actions, and not in actions between private parties.159  
Other cases remain relatively scarce. The Gortz Haus, an Iowa gift 
shop and bistro, settled a discrimination case based on its refusal to host 
same sex wedding celebrations.160 The Liberty Ridge Farm case in New 
York State is on appeal to state courts from an administrative finding of 
discrimination, and consequent damage liability, against a family-owned 
farm that hosted weddings but refused to be available for a same sex 
wedding. 161  A similar case from Colorado, involving Masterpiece                                                         
158  284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). At the time of suit and decision in Elane Photography, New 
Mexico did not recognize civil marriage between same sex partners. Id. The legal status of 
marriage is irrelevant to these disputes. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Apocalypse 
Now?, CORNERSTONE BLOG (June 29, 2015), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ 
cornerstone/obergefell-v-hodges-the-ruling-and-its-implications-for-religious-
freedom/responses/apocalypse-now. 
159  309 P.3d at 76–78. The Ocean Grove case in New Jersey, while not involving a 
typical vendor, is another prominent example of a dispute between a same sex couple and a 
provider of space for a wedding celebration. Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting 
Ass'n, 2012 WL 169302 (N.J. Adm. 2012). Professor Tuttle and I carefully analyze the 
Ocean Grove case in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and 
Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 279-282 (2010). 
160  Grant Rodgers, Grimes’   Gortz   Haus   to   Stop All Weddings in Wake of 
Discrimination Complaint, DES MOINES REGISTER (Jan. 28, 2015, 6:49 PM), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/investigations/2015/01/28/gortz-haus-owne 
rs-decide-stop-weddings/22492677/?hootPostID=%5B%22%5B%277f196770f8af7162828 
75c2320afaadc%27%5D%22%5D. Iowa has neither a RFRA nor a body of state 
constitutional law especially sensitive to impact of laws on religious exercise.  
161  See N.Y.   Farm   Fined   $13,000   for   Refusing   to   host   Lesbian   Couple’s   Wedding, 
LGBTQ NATION (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2014/08/n-y-farm-fined-
13000-for-refusing-to-host-lesbian-couples-wedding/. 
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Cakeshop, produced an identical disposition from a state administrative law 
judge,162 recently affirmed by an intermediate appellate court.163 Iowa, New 
York, and Colorado are among the states that do not have a RFRA. 
Two other prominent cases in progress are on the West Coast – the 
Klein case (Sweetcakes by Melissa) in Oregon, involving a bakery that 
refused to prepare a cake for a same sex wedding reception,164 and the 
Ingersoll case in Washington State, involving a florist who refused to 
provide floral arrangements for a same sex wedding.165 In the Oregon case, 
an administrative law judge gave summary judgment to the prosecuting 
agency, and rejected all constitutional defenses, state and federal, offered by 
the Kleins. Oregon lacks a RFRA, and its state constitutional protection for 
religion against incidental burdens is weak.166  
The Ingersoll case, in which a Superior Court judge gave summary 
judgment to Washington State and the complaining same-sex couple, may 
prove to be the most substantively significant so far. Washington State does 
not have a RFRA, but its state constitution has been construed in a religion-
supportive way,167 akin to federal Free Exercise Clause precedents prior to 
the decision in Employment Division v. Smith. Nevertheless, in what 
appears to be the first head-on confrontation between an LGBT 
discrimination claim and rights asserted under a religion-protective state 
law regime, Superior Court Judge Ekstrom ruled emphatically against the 
flower shop and its owner. Although Judge Ekstrom was willing to assume 
that application of anti-discrimination law substantially burdened the 
florist,168 he concluded that the state had a compelling interest in combating 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.169 He then rejected as legally                                                         
162  See Zahira Torres, Civil Rights Commission Says Lakewood Bakery Discriminated 
Against Gay Couple, DENVER POST (May 30, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ 
ci_25865871/civil-rights-commission-says-lakewood-baker-discriminated-against.  
163  Craig and Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 2015COA115 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2015), available at https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Court_of_Appeals/Opinion/ 
2015/14CA1351-PD.pdf. 
164  In the Matter of Melissa Elaine Klein, dba Sweetcakes by Melissa, 2015 WL 
4868796 (OR BOLI 2015). 
165 Washington  v.  Arlene’s  Flowers,  Inc.,  and  Ingersoll  &  Freed  v.  Arlene’s  Flowers,  Inc.,  
No. 13-2-00871-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2015) available at http://www.adfmedia.org/ 
files/ArlenesFlowersSJruling.pdf. 
166  See, e.g., Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995) 
(containing the reasoning the administrative law judge relied on in Klein).  
167  See, e.g., Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211 P. 3d 406 (Wash. 
2009). 
168  Ingersoll, No. 13-2-00871-5, at 47-48. 
169  Id. at 48-50. 
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insufficient the alternative of referral to other, willing florists by the 
service-refusing florist; that alternative, he reasoned, was effectively a 
permission slip for discrimination.170  
The Ingersoll case is not over; the case is now on appeal to a higher 
state court in Washington. 171  Washington does not have a RFRA.                                                         
170  Id. at 50-51. In her paper for this Symposium, Elizabeth Sepper develops further the 
arguments against a system of referrals as an adequate alternative for a generally applicable 
prohibition on discrimination. Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moral Marketplace, 7 ALA. 
C.R. & C.L. L. REV (forthcoming 2016). 
171  See Ingersoll  v.  Arlene’s  Flowers,  Inc.,  No.  13-2-00953-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2015), 
available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ArlenesFlowersAppealNotice.pdf. Ingersoll 
also presents an issue that appears in other wedding vendor cases—whether application of 
anti-discrimination law in the case of services with a creative component violates the First 
Amendment’s  prohibition  on   compelled   speech.   In  Elane Photography, the New Mexico 
Supreme  Court  rejected  the  photographer’s  compelled  speech  defense.  Elane Photography, 
309 P.3d at 63–76. In Ingersoll, Judge Ekstrom rejected the argument. He  wrote,  “Because  
anti-discrimination laws by their nature require equal treatment, they cannot be defeated by 
the claim that equal treatment requires communication or expression with which the 
speaker  disagrees.”  Ingersoll, No. 13-2-00953-3 at 39. For a smart and broader take on this 
question, see Hunter, supra note 144 (arguing that obedience to anti-discrimination law is 
not inherently expressive).  
 
When a vendor generally refuses to publish messages with which she disagrees, the 
compelled speech argument may have some force. See Hands-On Originals, Inc. v. 
Lexington-Fayette  Urban  Cnty.  Human  Rights  Comm’n,  No.  14-CI-04474 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 
3d Div. 2015), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HandsOnOriginalsDecision.pdf 
(compelled speech doctrine protects t-shirt producer, with an announced and adhered-to 
policy  of   “refusing any order that [would] endorse positions that would conflict with the 
[religious]   convictions   of   the   ownership,”   from   an   order   to   produce   shirts   that   say   “gay  
pride.”)  In  a  much  briefer  part  of  the  opinion,  the  Kentucky  court  also  ruled  that  imposing  
liability  on  the  producer  would  violate  the  state’s  religious  freedom  statute.  For  discussion  
of the many issues that may arise in connection with a compelled speech defense to a 
discrimination case against a wedding vendor, see Andrew Koppelman, A Zombie in the 
Supreme Court: The Elane Photography Cert. Denial, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV 
(forthcoming 2016); Mark Strasser, Speech, Association, Conscience, and the First 
Amendment’s  Orientation, 91 DENVER L. REV. 495 (2014); Susan Nabet, Note, For Sale: 
The Threat of State Public Accommodations Law to the First Amendment Rights of Artistic 
Businesses, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1515 (2012); James M. Gottry, Note, Just Shoot Me: 
Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Laws Aim at First Amendment Freedom of 
Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961 (2011).  
In some professions, considerations of ethics or competence may permit declining certain 
undertakings, but not declining certain classes of clients. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 
109 (arguing against all religion-based exemptions from anti-discrimination laws in 
commercial dealings, but suggesting that a marriage counselor or other professional who 
must create bonds of trust with a client may refer to other providers when the client 
presents issues to which the professional cannot effectively respond).  
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Accordingly, Hobby Lobby will play at most a remote role in the disposition 
of the religious liberty issues in Ingersoll. The case has yet to arise that 
presents the perfect conflict between strong vendor-supportive norms of 
religious exemption, and strong consumer-supportive norms of anti-
discrimination.  
 
B. Hobby Lobby in the State Legislative Politics to Come 
 
As noted above, twenty-two states have anti-discrimination laws that 
cover LGBT people, twenty-one states have RFRA’s,   and only four have 
both.172 The arithmetic is simple – thirty-nine states have one or the other 
but not both (22 + 21, minus the overlap of 4). That means eleven states 
have neither a RFRA nor a state-wide LGBT anti-discrimination law. These 
include socially conservative strongholds like Georgia, Montana, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska. As discussed further below, Arkansas 
and Indiana have recently enacted RFRAs, though Indiana, after 
tremendous national pressure, carved out anti-discrimination laws from its 
coverage.173 In March 2015, in Utah, the prominent and influential Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints joined with LGBT rights groups to 
present a compromise package, which soon became law.174 Obergefell v.                                                         
172  The District of Columbia also has both, because it is subject to federal RFRA.  
173  Tony Cook, Tom LoBianco & Doug Stanglin, Indiana Governor Signs Amended 
Religious Freedom Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2015/04/02/indiana-religious-freedom-law-deal-gay-discrimination/7081 
9106/. I am a co-signatory to a letter critical of the original Indiana proposals. See Letter 
from Katherine Franke, Isidor & Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia 
University et al., to Ed DeLaney, Representative of Indiana (Feb. 27, 2015), available at 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/law_professors_ 
letter_on_indiana_rfra.pdf. I was also co-signatory to a similarly critical letter regarding the 
unsuccessful Georgia proposal. Letter from Ira C. Lupu et al., F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis 
Professor of Law Emeritus, George Washington University, to Governor Nathan Deal, et 
al. (Jan. 21, 2015), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/ 
gender-sexuality/georgia-religious-freedom-letter.pdf (containing critical analysis of 
original Georgia proposal).  
174  See S.B.   296,   2015   Leg.,   2015   Gen.   Sess.   (Utah   2015)   (containing   Utah’s  
Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, which outlaw discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment and housing, but not public 
accommodations, with exceptions for religious organizations and the Boy Scouts), 
available at http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/SB0296.html. The Church had previously 
signaled it was open to such non-discrimination proposals, but only if such laws respected 
the religious freedom of those who objected to same sex intimacy and marriage. Michelle 
Boorstein & Abbby Ohlheiser, Mormon Church Announces Support for Legal Protections 
for Gay People, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/  
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Hodges, which mandates marriage equality under the 14th Amendment, 
invites the strong possibility of more such negotiations, initiated by both 
sides.175 
 In appraising the relative bargaining power of the competing factions 
under current conditions, it is instructive to recall the last major round of 
legislative fights. They occurred in mostly blue states, and the issues arose 
in relation to legislative recognition of marriage equality. Between 2009 and 
2014, a number of states enacted such legislation,176 and religious freedom 
concerns rose and fell in what became a predictable course. First and 
foremost, religious opponents of marriage equality did not show up to 
bargain; they came to block the new laws. Their basic position was full 
opposition to marriage equality.177  
 A group of scholars, some of whom supported same-sex marriage, 
approached the issues differently. This group, frequently led by Professor 
Douglas Laycock and Professor Robin Wilson, focused on the concern for 
religious liberty in the context of changes in the law of marriage. They 
argued consistently that marriage equality laws should include specific 
provisions exempting: 1) clergy and houses of worship from any obligation 
to cooperate in same sex weddings; 2) religious non-profits from any 
obligation to provide family services, such as adoption or marriage 
counseling, to same sex couples; 3) public employees and officials from any 
obligation to issue licenses or otherwise cooperate in achieving legal status 
for same sex marriages; 4) small businesses that sell goods and services 
from the obligation to supply them to same sex weddings, unless the denial 
would cause substantial hardship; and 5) employers from any obligation to 
                                                                                                                                            
local/wp/2015/01/27/mormon-church-to-announce-support-for-legal-protections-for-gay-
people/. 
175  Conversations in Indiana in the fall of 2015 suggest the difficulties of finding 
common ground. Stephanie Wang, Can Indiana Compromise on LGBT Rights, Religious 
Liberty?, INDY STAR (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/ 
2015/10/03/can-indiana-compromise-lgbt-rights-religious-liberty/73225792/. 
176  Professor Tuttle and I documented and analyzed that last round in detail in Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 159 (discussing various provisions of then-new same sex marriage laws 
in New Hampshire, New York, DC, Vermont, Maine, Connecticut).  
177  See, e.g., THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015) (containing writings on marriage, both before and after Obergefell); 
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE, http://www.nomblog.com/ (last visited Sept. 
27, 2015) (same). See also Statement Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v. 
Hodges, supra note 37. 
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treat same sex marriages as valid – for example, in the provision of fringe 
benefits to spouses.178 
At that time, the legislative resolution of these fall-back demands were 
quite similar, state to state. As Professor Tuttle and I documented the scene, 
state legislatures always included the exemptions for clergy and houses of 
worship, who had never been covered in the first place by non-
discrimination laws;179 they sometimes included exemptions for religious 
non-profit organizations from antidiscrimination laws covering the 
beneficiaries of services, though the exemptions applied only if these 
organizations were funded through exclusively private sources;180 and they 
never included exemptions for public employees, commercial vendors, or 
private, secular employers. This pattern reflected the distribution of political 
power between the camps in the blue states, where support for marriage 
equality far exceeded support for broad religious exemptions.  
The pattern also reflected a sound comprehension of constitutional 
principles. Clergy and houses of worship are off-limits from state regulation 
with respect to conferral of blessings and sacraments.181 Public employees 
are already regulated by the Constitution. 182  Commercial vendors and 
private, secular employers are subject to extensive regulation, and present a 
deeply unsympathetic case on policy grounds for religious exemption.183 
                                                        
178 For a collection of letters to state legislators making these and similar proposals, see 
Berg, supra note 102. For a set of arguments in opposition to such a proposal in the Illinois 
Legislature, see Letter from Professor Dale Carpenter and Other Religious Liberty Scholars 
Opposing  Illinois  “Marriage  Conscience  Protection”  Provisions  (Oct.  23,  2013),  available 
at http://perma.cc/5PXG-JG69. I was among the signatories to this letter. Id. 
179  Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 275. 
180  Connecticut is the leading example of this. See id. at 299. 
181 Id. at 282-86. Selection of clergy also represents a purely ecclesiastical question, one 
that the state is not constitutionally competent to answer. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694. 
182  See discussion in Part I supra text accompanying notes 25-44. For development of 
this point, see also Memorandum from the Public Rights/Private Conscience Project to the 
Interested Parties of Columbia University Sch. of Law (June 30, 2015), available at 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/marriage_ 
exemptions_memo_june_30.pdf. The recent Utah legislation is relevant to this discussion. 
See Utah S.B. 297, supra note 48, § 7, lines 201-205 (allowing individual employees to opt 
out of providing marriage services); id. § 1, lines 72-78 (ensuring that every county in the 
state will provide marriage services to all eligible couples). Under both Equal Protection 
and Establishment Clause principles, any accommodations of public employees with 
respect to duties toward same sex couples must be designed to do no harm, either by 
dignitary injury or discriminatory delay.  
183  Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 286-295. See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 109. 
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Religious non-profits fall into an intermediate zone of constitutional and 
policy concern.184 
That was five years ago, when marriage equality was the focus of the 
legislation. That focus invited the possibility of bargains over marriage 
equality and religious liberty. In  today’s  circumstances,  marriage equality is 
no longer the product of legislation; it is the outcome of litigation in the 
federal courts, and, for the moment, that litigation does not involve any 
questions whatsoever of religious freedom. For purposes of legislative 
bargaining about anti-discrimination norms and competing religious 
freedom concerns, the current context resembles the period between 2003 
and 2008, when state courts were doing the work of marriage equality under 
state constitutions,185 and religious exemptions were similarly not on the 
table. 
When courts are adjudicating the marriage question, as was the case 
between 2003 and 2008, and is again today, the bargaining leverage for 
those seeking religious accommodation is considerably less than in the days 
when legislatures were the center of policy making on marriage.186 The 
marriage equality campaign no longer needs legislatures, in red states or 
otherwise. In seeking broad anti-discrimination legislation, however, the 
LGBT rights camp does indeed need legislatures. State legislatures in the 
most religiously conservative states will be the most difficult in which to 
make such progress, and the most receptive to religious exemptions if 
progress were to be made.187 
If such broad LGBT rights legislation becomes politically plausible in 
conservative states, now or in the future, those who seek religious 
exemptions from it will also be seeking legislative cooperation. Explicit 
exemptions are obviously the strongest defense against any obligations not 
to discriminate. For example, in Kansas in the spring of 2014, legislators 
introduced a proposal entitled   “AN   ACT   concerning   religious   freedoms                                                         
184  Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 295-305. For a recent analysis of this set of 
problems, see Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 25 (2015). 
185  We collect the state court decisions, with relevant citations, in Lupu & Tuttle, supra 
note 159, at 274 n.2 (citing decisions from Massachusetts, Iowa, California, Connecticut, 
and Vermont). 
186  See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same Sex Marriage and 
Religious Liberty Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2014). 
187  Compare the new Utah legislation (S.B. 296 and S.B. 297), discussed supra note 44. 
It addresses discrimination in employment and housing, but not in public accommodations, 
and creates explicit exemptions for religious entities and the Boy Scouts, but not for 
businesses. Id. 
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with respect to marriage.”188 The proposal would have very specifically 
precluded   the   imposition   of   any   legal   duty   on   an   “individual   or   religious  
entity”   to  provide   any   services  or   goods   related   to any marriage or to the 
celebration  of  any  marriage,  or  any  legal  duty  to  “treat  any  marriage  .  .  .  as  
valid.”189 The  proposed   law  defined   “religious   entity”   to   include   privately  
held, for-profit businesses as well as non-profit entities.190 Such explicit 
exemptions,  however,  invite  the  most  virulent  political  attacks  as  “licenses  
to   discriminate.” The proposed Kansas law was indeed an effort to 
preemptively bar the application of yet non-existent anti-discrimination 
norms to businesses, public employees, and others who objected on 
religious grounds to same-sex unions. As such, the proposal triggered a 
firestorm of criticism, and the state senate eventually rejected it.191  
In the spring of 2015, as the national constitutional mandate of 
marriage equality loomed ever closer, other states began to consider such 
explicit exemptions from any legal duties, present or future, to treat all 
marriages equally. 192  Most prominent among these was Louisiana’s  
proposed Marriage and Conscience Act,193 which would have protected all 
persons (including corporations) from any adverse action by the state in 
response   to   an   “act[]   in   accordance   with   a   religious   belief   or   moral  
conviction  about   the   institution  of  marriage.”194 Governor Jindal and some                                                         
188  H.B. 2453, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2014 (Kan. 2014), available at 
http://perma.cc/3FJT-DM42. 
189  Id. § 1(c). 
190  Id. § 3(a). 
191  Bryan Lowry, Kansas Senate Leaders Kill Controversial Religious Freedom Bill, 
WICHITA EAGLE (Feb. 18, 2014), http://perma.cc/5UWU-HHLV. The Arizona episode 
followed soon thereafter. Aaron Blake, Arizona Governor Vetoes Controversial Bill 
Allowing Denial of Services to Gays, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/02/26/arizona-governor-
vetoes-controversial-bill-allowing-denial-of-service-to-gays/. 
192  The ACLU maintains a data base with a complete list of such recent proposals. Anti-
LGBT Religious Refusals Legislation Across the Country, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/ 
anti-lgbt-religious-refusals-legislation-across-country?redirect=lgbt-rights/anti-lgbt-religiou 
s-refusals-legislation-across-country#mare (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
193 H.B. 707, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/ 
legis/BillInfo.aspx?s=15RS&b=HB707&sbi=y.  
194  Id. §   5245  A   (“Notwithstanding   any   other   law   to   the   contrary,   this   state   shall   not  
take any adverse action against a person, wholly or partially, on the basis that such person 
acts in accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction about the institution of 
marriage.”).  A  similar,  unsuccessful  proposal  appeared  in  Texas.  See H.B. 2553, 84th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2015), available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/ 
Text.aspx?LegSess=84R&Bill=HB2553 (“Sec. 606.001.RIGHT TO REFUSE TO 
PROVIDE GOODS OR SERVICES. (a) A private business owner may refuse to provide  
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legislators were in support, but many large business interests, LGBT rights 
groups, and religious leaders were sharply critical, and the proposal died.195 
Until the spring of 2015, in the many states where explicit exemptions 
cannot get political approval, a second best solution for exemption 
supporters had been a generic religious freedom statute like a RFRA. These 
once had the virtues and vices of vagueness. They do not mention marriage, 
and it is impossible to predict with certainty whether a RFRA can be 
successfully invoked as a defense to a private or government-instituted 
action against a discriminator.196 
In the spring of 2014, Professor Thomas Berg described the 
atmosphere for generic religious freedom protections in state law as 
“toxic,”197 because of the perceived association between religious freedom 
and hostility to LGBT rights. If such a perception was at that time held only 
among rights activists and a few scholars, the circumstances have now 
changed dramatically. In the current political and cultural climate, proposed                                                                                                                                             
goods or services to any person based on a sincerely held religious belief or on 
conscientious  grounds.”).  The  proposed  federal  “First  Amendment  Defense  Act,”  discussed  
in Part II, supra, has analogous content. 
195  See Emily Lane, Louisiana’s   Religious   Freedom   Bill   Effectively   Defeated   in  
Committee, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 19, 2015), http://www.nola.com/ 
politics/index.ssf/2015/05/louisianas_religious_freedom_b.html. Governor Jindal described 
the opponents of the Bill as being under pressure from radical liberals. Bobby Jindal, I’m  
Holding Firm Against Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/bobby-jindal-im-holding-firm-against-gay-
marriage.html the competing forces. Some   of   Jindal’s   critics   can   hardly   be   described   as  
radical liberals. See Rabbi Gabriel Greenberg, A   Religious   Case   Against   Louisiana’s  
Religious Freedom Bill, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (April 24, 2015), 
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2015/04/religious_freedom_louisiana.html. Rabbi 
Greenberg is an Orthodox rabbi in Metairie, La. Same sex couples would not be permitted 
to marry in his branch of Judaism. Id. Governor Jindal eventually issued an Executive 
Order,   “Marriage   and  Conscience  Order,”  which   urges   state   agencies   to   be   respectful   of  
religious conscience in cases involving objectors to same sex marriage. Exec. Order BJ 15-
8, DOA.LA.GOV, available at http://www.doa.louisiana.gov/osr/other/bj15-8.htm (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015). The Order appears to add nothing to existing Louisiana law. 
196  Among other possibilities, the discriminator may be shown to be lacking a sincere 
religious belief in the duty to avoid complicity in certain activities; or the state may have a 
compelling interest in ending the discrimination, even if the prohibition burdens religious 
exercise. But none of these outcomes can be predicted with certainty, especially in states 
where RFRAs are new, and have been enacted in the shadow of the expected new regime 
of marriage equality. 
197  Thomas Berg, The  Scholars’  Mississippi  Letter:  RFRAs   in  General  Are  Now  Bad, 
MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Mar. 25, 2014), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/ 
2014/03/the-scholars-mississippi-letter-rfras-in-general-are-now-bad.html (“[P]olitically 
this  is  an  impossibly  toxic  time  to  propose  a  state  RFRA.”). 
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RFRAs are a whistle that everyone can hear.198 After Governor Pence of 
Indiana  signed  his   state’s  newly  enacted  RFRA  on  March 26, 2015,199 the 
NCAA, major business corporations including Apple, Inc., and a broad 
array of political leaders immediately mounted great pressure on Indiana 
political leaders to clarify that the new law could not be used as a defense to 
an action under state or local anti-discrimination law.200 Within days, the 
Indiana Legislature had revised the law to so clarify, and the Governor had 
signed the amended version.201 
How will the Hobby Lobby decision affect this political atmosphere? 
More importantly, how will Hobby Lobby affect interpretations by state 
courts of their own RFRAs, many of which were enacted years before 
marriage equality seemed imminent anywhere in the United States? In 
discussions of proposed federal legislation, Hobby Lobby operates directly, 
because federal RFRA modifies all of federal law. In considering the impact 
of RFRA on rights conferred by new federal law, lawyers can argue about 
the scope and meaning of Hobby Lobby, but not about its applicability. 
Thus, as discussed in Part II above, lobbyists and federal legislators will                                                         
198  Erik Eckholm, Religious Protection Laws, Once Called Shields, Are Now Seen as 
Cudgels, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/us/politics/ 
religious-protection-laws-once-called-shields-are-now-seen-as-cudgels.html. 
199  Indiana: Bill Signed Allowing Denial of Service to Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/us/politics/indiana-bill-signed-allowing-denial 
-of-service-to-gays.html. See also Here   It   Is:   The  Text   of   Indiana’s   ‘Religious  Freedom’  
Law, INDYSTAR (Apr. 2, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/ 
politics/2015/03/27/text-indianas-religious-freedom-law/70539772/. 
200  The State of Indiana does not have a law that forbids discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity, but Indianapolis does, as do other local governments in 
Indiana. See, e.g., INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 581-101 (2008). Controversy over these 
issues continues in Indiana. Stephanie Wang, supra note 175. 
201  Wesley Lowery, Gov. Pence Signs Revised Indiana Religious Freedom Bill Into 
Law, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/04/02/gov-pence-signs-revised-indiana-religious-freedom-bill-into-law/. 
See also Conference Committee Report, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/ 
1699997-read-the-updated-indiana-religious-freedom.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) 
(containing the clarifying amendment to the Indiana RFRA). An earlier version of the 
amendment applied only to discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, 
and only to public accommodations. Tony Cook, Tom LoBianco & Brian Eason, Gov. 
Mike Pence Signs RFRA Fix, INDYSTAR (Apr. 2, 2015, 8:08 PM), 
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/indiana-rfra-deal-sets-limited-
protections-for-lgbt/70766920. The final, enacted version includes all covered categories of 
forbidden discrimination (race, sex, etc.), and all contexts (including housing, public and 
private employment, and public accommodations) in which discrimination is forbidden. Id. 
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negotiate in the shadow of the uncertain legal principles for which Hobby 
Lobby stands. 
When state courts interpret their own state’s  RFRA, however, Hobby 
Lobby operates only at the level of potentially persuasive, rather than 
binding, authority. If a state has a RFRA, Hobby Lobby may influence the 
state   courts’   construction  of   it. The most likely influence would be in the 
direction of pushing recognition of corporations, or other business entities, 
as   “persons”   who   can   mount   RFRA   claims. 202  Such a move is not 
dispositive; it opens the door for certain claims but does not guide the court 
to their ultimate resolution.203 
On dispositive questions, however, such as whether a state interest in 
preventing discrimination will usually or always trump religious exercise, 
Hobby Lobby is a far less reliable predictor of what state courts will do. 
From the perspective of those who seek the widest possible set of religious 
exemptions, Hobby Lobby might be viewed as significantly increasing the 
pre-existing likelihood that state courts would apply RFRA in favor of a 
religiously motivated discriminator.  
First, Hobby Lobby seemed unreceptive to the argument that actual or 
potential harm to third parties will necessarily be fatal to a successful RFRA 
claim.204 If state courts reasoned similarly, they would reject the argument                                                         
202  Lupu, supra note 11, at 99. See also Frank S. Ravitch, Be Careful What You Wish 
For: Why Hobby Lobby Weakens Religious Freedom, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV (forthcoming 
2015) at [SSRN version] 37-44, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2587503). For a recent example of a state court mechanically following Hobby 
Lobby on the question of corporate personhood, see Hands-On Originals, Inc. v. Lexington-
Fayette  Urban  Cnty.  Human  Rights  Comm’n,  No.  14-CI-04474, at 14 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 3d 
Div. 2015), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HandsOnOriginalsDecision.pdf. 
203  If I were advising a state legislature on this coverage issue in light of Hobby Lobby, I 
would suggest that courts   are   highly   likely   to   construe   “person”   in   a  RFRA   as   covering  
business entities, including corporations, unless the legislation or its history clearly indicate 
otherwise. The law of many states includes a presumption to this effect. See, e.g., GA. 
CODE ANN., §1-3-3 (14) (2010). See also Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 485 S.E.2d 
22 (Ga. 1997) (stating that "[a] corporation is a 'person'" and citing §1-3-3 to support that 
proposition). 
204  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (characterizing the harm as a refusal to extend 
benefits to third parties). The most strenuous version of this argument appears in Frederick 
Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassel, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
343, 356–71 (2014). Professor Nelson Tebbe has proposed in testimony to a Congressional 
Committee that RFRA be amended to clarify that a showing of material harm to third 
parties would always be fatal to a RFRA claim or defense. Oversight of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil  
58 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 7   
 
by a victim of discrimination that a decrease in convenience, access to 
goods, or respect in the marketplace necessarily trumped a RFRA claim to 
be free to refuse to engage in commerce with certain customers. 
Second, in holding that commercial entities can escape regulation as a 
result  of   their  owners’   religious  commitments, Hobby Lobby disconnected 
RFRA from the limitations associated with prior free exercise clause 
principles, particularly those strongly stated in U.S. v. Lee. 205  Lee had 
appeared to lay down a hard and fast rule that business entry constituted a 
form of waiver of religious objection to general business regulation.206 To 
the extent state courts had been committed to tracking such principles in 
their own RFRA interpretations, Hobby Lobby might lead state court judges 
to feel freer to abandon those principles. 
Third, in dicta, Hobby Lobby singled out only race discrimination as a 
concern of civil rights law that religious freedom should not be able to 
trump.207 This prominent omission of discrimination based on sex, religion, 
national origin, or LGBT status suggests that the government interests in 
eradicating any of those categories of discrimination might not be 
compelling, and that religious freedom might therefore prevail over such 
interests. This omission was of particular and obvious alarm to advocates of 
equality rights for women as well as members of the LGBT community. 
These propositions, if imported into state court interpretations of 
RFRAs, make such laws considerably more potent in their application to 
discrimination disputes. 208  The awareness of that potential potency, 
however, contributes substantially to the atmospheric toxicity of RFRAs,                                                                                                                                             
Justice, 114th Cong. (2015), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/497441bc-
b2fa-4b10-8ade-91f6603588fe/tebbe-02132015.pdf.  
205  U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982). See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783-84. For 
comment on this aspect of Hobby Lobby, see William P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad 
Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71 (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2562949; James M. Oleske, Jr., The 
Born Again Champion of Conscience, 18 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 75, 87-90 (2015) (book 
review). 
206  “When   followers  of   a   particular   sect   enter   into   commercial   activity   as   a  matter   of  
choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are 
not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that 
activity.”  Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. 
207  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783. 
208  State RFRAs will also be more potent if the courts construe them to apply to private 
rights of action. For discussion of the conflict among the Circuits on this question as 
applied to federal RFRA, see Shruti Chaganti, Note, Why the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act Provides a Defense in Suits by Private Parties, 99 VA. L. REV. 343 (2013). 
Hobby Lobby did not address this question. 
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both in legislative deliberations such as those in Indiana, and in future 
adjudication. Moreover, when viewed from the perspective of the strongest 
proponents of LGBT rights, Hobby Lobby may be seen as much narrower 
than the supporters of RFRAs might believe. In particular, Hobby Lobby 
was grounded on the potential availability to for-profits of the 
accommodation that the government had made available to religious non-
profits.209 The ultimate scope of the Hobby Lobby principle may depend on 
the extent to which government can respect religious liberty without 
undermining  the  government’s  programmatic goals.210 
The aftermath of Hobby Lobby for state legislative deliberations has 
thus become an ironic dance between RFRA proponents and opponents. 
The RFRA proponents assert the great importance of religious liberty, 
suggest that state RFRAs have been weakly construed, and downplay the 
force of Hobby Lobby, which may have strengthened the hand of federal 
RFRA claimants. 211  The RFRA opponents can point to and emphasize 
Hobby Lobby as a danger signal of impending illiberal interpretations, while 
simultaneously suggesting that Hobby Lobby is less serious a setback for 
reproductive rights than might be feared.212  
In this political climate, it is easy to see the possibility of endless 
legislative stalemate on LGBT rights and religious freedom. Champions of 
religious liberty will prefer broad and explicit religious exemptions, not                                                         
209  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-83. See also id. at 2785-87 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). The Obama Administration has now extended that accommodation to closely 
held corporations. See Coverage of Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 80 
Fed. Reg. 41318 et seq., (July 14, 2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2015-07-14/pdf/2015-17076.pdf. 
210  Although the accommodation for religious nonprofits has now been extended to a 
narrow class of closely held for-profit firms, see id. at 41323-41328, female employees, 
and female dependents of all employees, of the firms that prevailed in the litigation 
involving for-profit firms have been deprived of the relevant coverage since at least the end 
of June 2014, and will not receive coverage until the beginning of the next health plan year. 
Id. at 41322. 
211  See, e.g., Letter from Douglas Laycock et al., Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia, to Hon. Same Teasley, Georgia House of Representatives (Feb. 19, 2015), 
available at https://cmgajcpolitics.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/georgia-hb-218.pdf. See 
also Letter from Douglas Laycock et al., Professor of Law, University of Virginia, to Hon. 
Brent Steele, Chair of the Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee, at 5, (Feb. 3, 2015), 
available at http://www.faithlafayette.org/uploads/Church/LetterSupportingReligious 
FreedomRestoration.pdf. (“In  narrow  circumstances,  some  claims  to exemption from anti-
discrimination laws might properly succeed, especially when the anti-discrimination laws 
reach  into  religiously  sensitive  contexts.”)   
212  See, e.g., Lupu, et al., Letter to Nathan Deal, Governor of Georgia, supra note 173.  
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subject to judicial interest-balancing, for commercial vendors and public 
employees, as well as for clergy and religious institutions. Proponents of 
LGBT rights will be extremely unwilling to concede these explicit 
exemptions with respect to commerce and public employees, for fear of 
gutting  the  legislation’s  thrust. With respect to public servants, in particular, 
LGBT rights proponents will be rightly concerned about undermining the 
thrust of Obergefell. On the practical level, exemptions allow escape from 
anti-discrimination norms; on the symbolic level, exemptions legitimize 
anti-LGBT attitudes in the name of faith.  
Nor will proposed enactment of RFRAs, with their vague terms and 
interpretive uncertainties, operate to fully diffuse the opposition to LGBT 
rights legislation. RFRA proponents who are elected officials will be 
unwilling to identify the extent to which their agenda is the creation of a 
faith-based license to discriminate. In any event, RFRA supporters can have 
no confidence that courts will construe the statute to facilitate religious 
objections by vendors to providing goods and services to same-sex couples, 
or objections by public employees to serving same sex couples.  
By the same token of uncertainty, however, LGBT rights supporters 
will be unwilling to accept RFRAs, unless an Indiana-style exclusion of 
anti-discrimination laws is included. These groups will lack confidence that 
courts won’t so construe the statute, especially after LGBT rights groups 
have warned of precisely that danger.213 Moreover, RFRA opponents can 
also credibly argue that, at the margin, RFRAs may embolden potential 
discriminators214  and discourage litigation by their victims. At the very 
least, the presence of a RFRA changes the bargaining power of both sides, 
pre-litigation as well as in any settlement phase. 
Working out a modus vivendi between LBGT rights and religious 
freedom was inevitably going to be very difficult in the short run. Hobby 
Lobby has considerably aggravated this problem,215 and Obergefell will do 
little or nothing to neutralize the conflict. Time and cultural change,                                                         
213  Id. at 4-7. 
214  See Paxton Opinion, supra note 38, at 2-4. Sections  1   and  2  of  Governor   Jindal’s  
“Marriage   and   Conscience   Order,”   http://www.doa.louisiana.gov/osr/other/bj15-8.htm, 
explicitly rely on the Louisiana RFRA for authority. Exec. Order BJ 15-8, supra note 201, 
as does the Memorandum from Thomas Enright, Executive Counsel, Office of Governor 
Bobby Jindal to Interested Parties (June 29, 2015), available at http://gov.louisiana.gov/ 
index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=5012. 
215  See generally Frank S. Ravitch, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why Hobby Lobby 
Weakens Religious Freedom, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV (forthcoming) at [SSRN version] 37-44, 
(describing effect of Hobby Lobby on political deliberations over a proposed RFRA, which 
was not enacted, in Michigan as well as deliberations in other states). 
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however, are on the side of LGBT rights proponents. I would encourage 
them to hold out for good deals later, and not make bad ones now.  
In an atmosphere so charged, is it possible that strong LGBT rights 
proposals can advance in conservative states? Utah managed such a feat, but 
only because of an unusual degree of cooperation and mutual respect 
between a single, dominant religious actor and LGBT rights groups. And 
even in Utah, legislation about public accommodations was left off the 
table, so the wedding vendor question was not resolved. Moreover, the Utah 
law was enacted against a longstanding background of broad exemptions 
from anti-discrimination laws for religiously affiliated organizations. 216 
Except for this recent example, these qualities of cooperation and mutual 
respect have been close to invisible in these fights over the past twenty 
years.217 
The remaining context for bargaining involves the interests of 
religiously affiliated social service organizations in being free to use their 
own parameters for distribution of social and family services. 218  Such 
services may have the quality of ministries, and our strong constitutional 
tradition is that privately supported religious ministries set their own criteria 
for who deserves and gets their help. This is only one short step removed 
from recognition that religious communities are autonomous in distribution 
of blessings and sacraments.219                                                          
216  See Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, & Micah Schwartzman, Utah  ‘Compromise’  
to Protect LGBT Citizens from Discrimination is No Model for the Nation, SLATE (Mar. 18, 
2015 3:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/18/gay_rights_the_utah_ 
compromise_is_no_model_for_the_nation.html (explaining  why   Utah’s   background   legal  
circumstances make the Utah compromise a poor model for other states or the United 
States). But see J. Stuart Adams & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Protecting Religious Equality 
Requires Protections for All, THE CORNERSTONE BLOG (July 31, 2014), 
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/cornerstone/rfra-in-indiana-and-beyond/responses/ 
protecting-religious-liberty-requires-protections-for-all (praising the Utah compromise).  
217  For an impressive recent call for mutual respect and appropriate forbearance in 
litigation, see Steve Sanders, RFRA and Reasonableness, IND. L.J. (forthcoming), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2661587. 
218  Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 296-305. Note that a recent Michigan proposal, 
which did not succeed, would have permitted publicly funded religious social service 
agencies to discriminate against same sex couples. See Kathleen Gray, Religious Liberty 
Bills Reemerge in State Legislature, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 23, 2015, 9:02AM), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/22/religious-liberty-bills-resurface-
state-legislature/23846599/. 
219  Nor is there any reasonable ground for apprehension that religious entities will lose 
their tax exempt status under state law because of their teachings on same sex intimacy. Cf. 
Sam Brunson, The Church Will Not Lose its Tax Exempt Status, BY COMMON CONSENT  
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Once these entities accept public funds or operate under public 
licensure, however, this right to exclude beneficiaries based on religious 
criteria becomes deeply problematic.220 Although neither receipt of public 
funds nor state licensure makes the recipient a state actor,221 both involve a 
version of official imprimatur on the recipient’s qualifications and 
performance of the service. Public funding involves the support of all 
taxpayers, whether or not they approve of the particular grantee or its 
policies, as well as discretionary decisions by public officials to allocate the 
funds to particular grantees. As recognized by the policies of the Faith-
Based and Community Initiative under President George W. Bush, 
beneficiaries should never be turned away on religious grounds from a 
publicly supported charity.222  
Licensure alone may present a closer question. Unlike public funding 
streams, which supplement private generosity, license requirements 
interfere with private freedoms, albeit in the good name of quality control 
over the licensed personnel or enterprise. This is a context for compromise 
and bargaining, where considerations of utility will play a part.223 If enough 
services—for example, in matters of foster care, or adoption—are available 
for all who need them, including those whose sexual orientation and/or 
gender identity will make them unwelcome in some quarters, perhaps 
licenses need not come with strong anti-discrimination requirements for 
religious providers. In the case of a provider that dominates the service                                                                                                                                             
(July 9, 2015), http://bycommonconsent.com/2015/07/09/the-church-will-not-lose-its-tax-
exempt-status/. I have seen no evidence that states are more aggressive than the federal 
government on such matters. 
220  See Brownstein, supra note 133, at 428. Indirect, or voucher-based, funding, does 
not implicate the government to the same extent in actions by the religious entity that 
redeems the vouchers, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), so long as the 
voucher arrangements do not steer beneficiaries into religious experience. Nevertheless, 
beneficiaries should not, on religious grounds, be made ineligible for voucher-funded 
programs. For discussion of the various issues raised by indirect funding, see generally Ira 
C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s   Future:   Vouchers,   Sectarian   Providers,   and   the  
Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917 (2003); see also Ira C. 
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government 
Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J. L. & POL. 537 (2002). 
221  See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (receipt of liquor license does 
not make licensee a state actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (receipt of 
public funds does not transform private actor into state actor); accord, Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
222  Exec. Order No. 13279, 3 CFR § 13279.2(d) (Dec. 12, 2002), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2002-12-16/pdf/02-31831.pdf. 
223  Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 159, at 297-303. 
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market and treats LGBT people in a discriminatory or disrespectful way, 
however, continued state licensure would be oppressive and unfair.  
Whether negotiations over such matters can solve the empirical 
problem of determining sufficiency of providers, as well as the problem of 
political   symbolism   in   affirming   a   “license   to   discriminate”   (even   among  
religiously affiliated non-profits), remains to be seen. To the extent 
legislation is necessary to guarantee the freedom of religious organizations 
to exclude beneficiaries based on LGBT status, there is no reason for LGBT 
rights advocates to concede on this point unless they are getting new and 
valuable anti-discrimination laws in exchange. 
 
C. Hobby Lobby and the Future of State Court Adjudication 
 
As chronicled above, there has yet been no case in which a state 
RFRA, modeled after federal RFRA, is put into square conflict with an anti-
discrimination law.224 The possible expansion of anti-discrimination laws 
into states that already have RFRAs increases the probability that such a 
case will arise. When that happens – for example, with respect to a wedding 
vendor, or a private employer who refuses on religious grounds to recognize 
a same sex spouse for purposes of fringe benefits – how should we expect 
the arguments to unfold? In particular, what role will Hobby Lobby play? 
Recall the discussion in Part I of this paper of the elements of a federal 
RFRA claim or defense. A party who relies on RFRA must demonstrate a 
substantial burden on her sincere religious exercise. If the claimant is 
unsuccessful on any of those points – sincerity, religiosity, burden, or 
substantiality – the claim will fail. If the claimant is successful on those 
points, which are frequently undisputed, the risk of non-persuasion shifts to 
whoever is opposing the RFRA claim. That party must show that denying 
the   requested  exemption   is   the   “least   restrictive   alternative”   to  “furthering  
[a]  compelling  governmental  interest.” 
State RFRAs tend to be very similar in their terms, and one would 
expect state court interpretations to converge around the interpretations of 
federal RFRA and those of other state RFRAs. In the past, as Professor 
Christopher Lund has demonstrated,225 those convergences have been in the                                                         
224  Elane Photography would have been such a case if the New Mexico Supreme Court 
had  not  construed  the  state’s  RFRA  to  be  inapplicable  to  a  private  lawsuit. 
225  Christopher Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 
S.D.L. REV 466, 477 n.67, tbl I (2010). See also Lupu, supra note 11 at 69-71 (suggesting 
not much has changed regarding interpretations of state RFRAs since Professor Lund  
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direction of weak interpretation. This has enabled the supporters of recently 
proposed state RFRAs, such as in Indiana, to portray these Bills as 
representing only marginal changes in the legal status quo.226 The looming 
question after Hobby Lobby is whether future state interpretations will 
strengthen the hand of religious objectors. In the broader, conceptual terms I 
suggested in Part I of this article, does Hobby Lobby represent a major step 
toward expanding and normalizing the concept of religious privilege in the 
law? 
In the immediate wake of Hobby Lobby, I expressed the view that state 
courts would continue to weakly construe state RFRAs.227 I confess that in 
appraising the situation going forward, I am slightly less confident than I 
once was. The rapid and explosive surge of marriage equality, arriving in 
conservative states by court order, inevitably will invite some form of 
political and cultural response. Very little of the response will take the form 
of public defiance of the sort demonstrated in Alabama by its Chief Judge 
and its Supreme Court. 228  Continued discrimination against same sex 
couples, in defiance of a federal court order, will invite injunctions, 
contempt citations, and significant awards of attorneys fees.229 Moreover, 
no state is going to permanently shut down the institution of marriage for 
different sex couples in order to stop same sex couples from getting its 
benefits. 
Under current conditions, what should we expect from state courts? 
What difference, if any, will Hobby Lobby make as persuasive, but not 
binding, authority? The most important quality of Hobby Lobby to note in 
this regard is its partial liberation from, and partial adherence to, the Free                                                                                                                                             
published his article, save perhaps in Texas). The effects of Hobby Lobby, however, have 
yet to be seen. 
226  Letter from Douglas Laycock et al., Professor of Law, University of Virginia, to 
Hon. Brent Steele, Chair of the Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee, 4-5 (Feb. 3, 2015), 
available at http://www.faithlafayette.org/uploads/Church/LetterSupportingReligious 
FreedomRestoration.pdf (asserting that state   and   federal   RFRAs   “have   been   very  
cautiously  enforced.”) 
227  Lupu, supra note 11, at 98-100. 
228  See Ex parte State of Ala., supra note 8. See also, Alabama Judge: Feds Should 
Issue Same Sex Marriage Licenses, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/0857f8d3607a4f959196bbc0a93147e3/alabama-judge-feds-
should-issue-same-sex-marriage-licenses. 
229  Procedural issues may continue to be important in any continued litigation over 
marriage equality. For analysis of the role played by these issues on the path to Obergefell, 
see Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 42 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstractid=2641943. 
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Exercise Clause precedents that many thought had been restored by federal 
RFRA. Before Hobby Lobby, lawyers had some confidence in the vitality of 
the Supreme  Court’s  firm  statement  in  U.S. v. Lee about those who enter the 
commercial realm being unable to superimpose their own faith-based limits 
“on  the  [regulatory]  schemes  .  .  . binding  on  others  in  that  activity.”230 That 
confidence has now been washed away. Under federal RFRA, commercial 
entities, in the corporate form or otherwise, are free to advance religious 
objections to regulatory schemes. Moreover, the strong commitment in 
Hobby Lobby to the Thomas rule, 231  involving self-declaration of the 
substantiality of the religious cost of complying with the law, precludes 
judicial second-guessing about the religious weight of the asserted burden 
on religious practice.  
Liberation from Lee, coupled with adherence to Thomas, represents a 
sweet package for commercial enterprises making RFRA claims. Although 
state courts need not follow Hobby Lobby in construction of state RFRAs, 
these propositions are likely to find their way into state interpretations, 
especially in cases where the enactment of a state RFRA has come after 
Hobby Lobby. Operationally, that means that few if any cases will be 
disposed of by a party not qualifying as  a  “person”  covered  by  RFRA,  or  on  
the   question   of   whether   that   person’s   religious   exercise   has   been  
substantially burdened by an anti-discrimination law. If state law imposes 
fines, money damages, or any other legal disability for refusal to serve a 
same sex wedding, or refusal to recognize a same sex spouse as eligible for 
employee benefits, state courts are likely to find a substantial burden on an 
objecting business owner’s  religious  exercise.232  
The sincerity question was not litigated in Hobby Lobby, and we know 
nothing more about what may become an evolving judicial approach to that 
than we did before that decision. I suggested in Part I of this paper that 
litigants in the future may challenge more frequently the religious sincerity 
of those who engage in discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity. But the lawyers from The Becket Fund and Alliance Defending                                                         
230  Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
231  Thomas, 134 S. Ct. at 2777-79. 
232  Direct   imposition   of   civil   damages,   a   fine,   or   imprisonment   for   following   one’s  
religious beliefs will always qualify as a substantial burden on religious exercise. 
Wisconsin  v.  Yoder,  406  U.S.  205  (1972).  In  addition,  “where the state conditions receipt 
of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies 
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon 
religion  exists.”  Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981). 
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Freedom, organizations most likely to mount the earliest test cases of the 
sort under discussion here, are experienced and able. They will screen 
potential clients, and choose to litigate only on behalf of those who are the 
most demonstrably sincere. So, in the earliest, precedent-setting cases, I do 
not expect the action to swirl around the question of sincerity. 
If this appraisal is correct, the dispositive questions will be 1) the 
weight  of   the  government’s   interests   in  denying  religious  exemptions,  and  
2) whether the government has alternative ways of satisfying those interests. 
And on these questions, the impact of Hobby Lobby will be either muted, or 
positively helpful to those who complain of LGBT discrimination.   
Hobby Lobby assumed,   rather   than   decided,   that   the   government’s  
interest in providing full contraceptive coverage to women was 
compelling. 233  The need to secure Justice   Kennedy’s   vote,   and   thereby  
make a majority, is the most likely explanation for that assumption,234 but 
that is irrelevant in the context of state court interpretations of their own 
RFRAs. The assumption drove the case into the ultimate question of 
whether the government had ways of satisfying its interests without 
burdening the religious exercise of Hobby Lobby and other, comparable 
objectors. Because the government had made an accommodation for non-
profits, and in any event might independently assume the costs and 
responsibility of full contraceptive insurance, the government could not 
justify imposing that responsibility on the religiously objecting firm.235 
With respect to laws prohibiting discrimination by sellers of goods and 
services, states are protecting two sets of strong interests – material access 
to goods and services, and protection against dignitary harm. Proponents of 
religious exemptions for vendors of wedding services typically focus on the 
former.236 Whatever  the  weight  of  the  state’s interest in guaranteeing access 
to goods and services, exemption proponents argue that most vendors will 
serve same sex couples, thereby guaranteeing sufficient access to the 
relevant goods. In states where exemption proponents have recommended                                                         
233  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. 
234  Lupu, supra note 11, at 84-85. 
235  Id. at 86-90. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780-82.  
236  Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same Sex Marriage 
from the Health-Care Context, in SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Douglas 
Laycock, et al., eds., 2008); Douglas Laycock, Afterword, id. at 194-201; see also Thomas 
Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 N.W. 
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); Andrew Koppelman, You Can't Hurry Love: Why 
Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 
BROOK. L. REV. 125 (2006).  
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explicit exemptions in the commercial sphere, they have included an 
exception for cases in which “a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any 
similar good or services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere 
without  substantial  hardship.”237 Implicit in such a proposal, which no state 
has ever adopted, is that alternative sources of the relevant goods are 
usually sufficient to satisfy state interests in ensuring adequate market 
access. Only   when   members   of   same   sex   couples   can   prove   “substantial  
hardship,”  by  virtue  of  inadequate  market  alternatives,  would  the  exemption  
not apply.  
Analogously, under RFRAs or analogous protections in state 
constitutions, objecting vendors argue that the state has an option less 
restrictive of religious liberty than full enforcement of anti-discrimination 
laws. The  “least  restrictive  alternative”  that  vendors  point  to  in  these  cases  
is the availability of equivalent goods and services from other vendors.238 
But satisfaction of  the  state’s  interests  in full and equal access to goods and 
services cannot be made to rise and fall on the fluctuating numbers, 
frequency, quality, and location of LGBT-friendly vendors.239 To permit a 
religious exemption under conditions of empirical uncertainty makes same 
sex couples subject to the ever-changing vagaries of market conditions, and 
imposes on courts intractable problems of measuring whether markets for 
particular goods in specific locations are sufficiently gay-friendly. 
Any such regime of exemptions, moreover, invites dignitary injury to 
those who are turned away, either to their face or by posted signs, by 
vendors. 240  Once this set of concerns is added to the RFRA equation,                                                         
237  Letter from Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson et al., to Governor Pat Quinn (Illinois) 
4 (Sept. 27, 2015), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/ill-letter-12-2012.pdf. 
This proposal is criticized in Letter from Professor Dale Carpenter and Other Religious 
Liberty Scholars 9-10 (Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/5PXG-JG69. 
238  Ingersoll, No. 13-2-00871-5,  at  50  (describing  and  rejecting  florist’s  argument   that  
referral to another vendor, willing and able to provide the goods, is sufficient to satisfy the 
state’s  interest  in  nondiscrimination).   
239  In this Symposium, Andrew Koppelman and Elizabeth Sepper disagree about the 
relevant empirical questions. Compare Andrew Koppelman, A Zombie in the Supreme 
Court: The Elane Photography Cert. Denial, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV (forthcoming 
2016) with Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moral Marketplace, ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV 
(forthcoming 2016). 
240  The Supreme Court has on several occasions emphasized the dignitary injuries 
caused by discrimination. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) 
(race discrimination); Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (sex discrimination). 
Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity works the same kind of 
dignitary injury. The LGBT rights literature has abundantly documented this claim. See,  
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vendors should lose, without regard to issues of market access. It is simply 
impossible for the government, or the private market, to make alternative 
provisions of equal dignity for victims of discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation or gender identity. The government cannot supply their 
dignitary wellbeing as they, in their roles as citizens, consumers, tenants, 
and employees, interact with others.241  
Even in conservative states, these dignitary interests should be the 
trump card in this game. Moreover, the dignitary interests at stake are 
unusually strong in cases about the provision of goods and services in 
connection with the ceremonies or status of marriage. Some of the religious 
objectors are wont to say that they are more than willing to have LGBT 
employees and customers;242 the objectors just draw their religious line at 
marriage. However authentically this posture captures their religious 
sentiment, it is spectacularly tone-deaf and insulting. The act of marrying 
represents a high point in the lives of many couples, particularly those 
same-sex couples who have lived for many years deprived by law and 
custom of such opportunities. Their actual and perceived status as being 
married, with the identical social, moral, and legal force as different sex 
couples, is of profound significance to their sense of equal citizenship. For a 
vendor, employer, or public official to discriminate against them with 
respect to their wedding or marital status is a deep assault on their full and 
equal place in American society. 
The unwilling vendors and other discriminators thus represent 
something far more disturbing than a narrowed consumer choice of a cake, 
flowers, or banquet hall. They represent a continuing and profound insult to 
those whom they refuse to serve. Why they do not have a crisis of 
conscience about delivering that blow is a puzzle to me. Forcing them to 
alter their policies, or to leave the relevant market, is the least restrictive                                                                                                                                             
e.g., Chai Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME SEX MARRIAGE 
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
241  Brownstein, supra note 133, at 420-421. 
242  See, e.g., State   of  Washington   v   Arlene’s   Flowers,   Ingersoll   v.   Arlene’s   Flowers:  
Overview, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/ 
News/PRDetail/8608 (last  visited  Sept.  30,  2015)  (“Barronelle Stutzman, the sole owner of 
Arlene’s  Flowers  in  Richland, Washington, has served and employed people who identify 
as homosexual for her entire career. Despite this, the American Civil Liberties Union and 
the Washington Attorney General claim that she is guilty of unlawful discrimination when 
she acted consistent with her faith and declined to use her creative skills to beautify the 
same-sex ceremony of a long-time customer, Robert Ingersoll, and another man, Curt 
Freed.”) 
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means of furthering the compelling governmental interest of equal dignity 
for LGBT people. If and when cases of this sort arrive in state courts, I hope 




I fully recognize the subversive quality of the argument just advanced. 
If I am correct, conservative lawmakers are betraying their constituencies if 
they accept a RFRA-type law in exchange for support of an LGBT anti-
discrimination law. Conservative lawmakers can only serve the interests of 
religious objectors by holding out for explicit exemptions, not subject to 
interest balancing by the judiciary, for religious objectors. In its own limited 
terms, this was precisely the sort of deal that triumphed in Utah, where both 
sides could respectably claim legislative accomplishments. 
LGBT rights advocates, under certain political conditions, thus might 
accept a proposal with some explicit exemptions for religious nonprofits, in 
exchange for a statewide law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity in various contexts. It’s  not  my  place  to  speak  
for the political interests of such communities, but I would respectfully 
advise them to walk away from a proposal that extends exemptions to 
anyone other than religious institutions, funded entirely from private 
sources. Despite Obergefell’s   nod   to   the   existence   of   good   faith   religious  
opinion against same sex marriage, 244  religious objections to same sex 
intimacy will ultimately retain no more respect than religious objections to 
racial integration and inter-racial intimacy.245 In a nation committed to a                                                         
243  The situation of a state RFRA in conflict with a local anti-discrimination law 
presents nothing different. A city or county may have compelling interests – economic as 
well as dignitary - in eradicating a form of discrimination, and nothing in the conventional 
relationship of state and local government precludes recognition of local interests as 
sufficiently compelling to trump state-created rights, of religious liberty or otherwise. In a 
number of states, the movement to outlaw such discrimination in employment, housing, 
and other spheres of life has been far more successful at the local than at the state level. See 
Williams Institute, State Resource Map, supra note 157. For example, Arizona has no such 
state-wide law, but Phoenix forbids local discrimination based on LGBT status. Similar 
circumstances obtain in Atlanta and other local jurisdictions in Georgia; Austin, Dallas, and 
San Antonio in Texas; and Indianapolis and Bloomington, in Indiana. Id. There are many 
other such examples. 
244  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
245  See Oleske, supra note 59; William B. Eskridge, Jr., It’s  Not  Gay  Marriage  vs.  the  
Church Anymore, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/ 
opinion/sunday/its-not-gay-marriage-vs-the-church-anymore.html?emc=edit_th_20150426 
&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=61084530&_r=0.  
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more Perfect Union, the arc of the religious universe is long, but it too 
bends toward justice.246 
                                                        
246  For information on the source of the analogous observation about the moral 
universe, frequently attributed to Martin Luther King, Jr., see The Arc of the Moral 
Universe is Long But it Bends Toward Justice, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, 
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/11/15/arc-of-universe/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). In 
his appraisal of the ways in which such a transition among religious conservatives may 
occur, Professor Laycock is undoubtedly correct that   “[i]t  makes  all   the  difference   in   the  
world   how   we   get   there.”   Douglas   Laycock,   Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of 
Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407,  419  (2011).  Every  tactical  choice  of  “how  we  get  
there,”  however,  has  a  different  calculus  of  costs and benefits for each side. 
